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Preaching to the Court House and Judging in the
Temple
Nathan B. Oman
On the evening of September 9, 1831, two men arrived in the
small county seat of Jacksonville, Illinois. It was court day, and
“there were a great many country people in the village.”1 Some no
doubt had come to settle disputes before the state’s travelling
judiciary. Illinois law required that all members of the state supreme
court hold a circuit court in each county seat at least twice a year.2 In
their wake came the lawyers who “rode circuit” with the judges,
picking up clients at the local tavern3 and hurriedly conferring with
them before rising to make their arguments about this man’s failure
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1. The Manuscripts of William E. McLellin (1831–36), Journal I, July 18, 1831–
November 20, 1831, 29–60, in THE JOURNALS OF WILLIAM E. MCLELLIN, 1831–1836 at 39
(Jan Shipps & John W. Welch eds., 1994). Cf. CARL R. LOUNSBURY, THE COURTHOUSES OF
EARLY VIRGINIA: AN ARCHITECTURAL HISTORY 3 (2005) (“Court day in early Virginia
transformed many small crossroad villages into bustling rural forums. For one, two, or three
days of each month, hundreds of inhabitants set out from their farms . . . [to] the center of the
county at a clearing commonly called the courthouse grounds.”).
2. See 1 FREDERIC B. CROSSLEY, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF ILLINOIS 162–68 (1916)
(discussing the convoluted, on-again-off-again history of circuit courts in Illinois prior to
1830).
3. HENRY C. WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 41 (Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1892) (“[O]ur offices were ambulatory, being located now on the
sunny side of a Court House, then under the shade of a friendly tree, and, anon, on the edge
of a sidewalk.”).
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to pay on a note or the damage done by that man’s wandering cow.4
Others came to watch the spectacle of the court. This September
evening, however, afforded the citizens of Morgan County a
different kind of performance. The first of the two men was a school
teacher turned preacher named William McLellin; his companion
was Hyrum Smith, brother of the Mormon prophet Joseph Smith
Jr.5 McLellin recorded:
[A]s soon as they found out who we were, they gathered around
us; we separated and talked with them about two hours. I cut some
of them so close with the truth that a ruffian fellow rolled up his
sleeves and swore that he could give it to me but a gentleman
prevented him and took him away.6

The two Mormon elders made an appointment to “preach next
day in the Court house.”7 At the designated time, a “numerous
concourse of people” gathered, and McLellin recorded his
trepidation at having “to ascend the judges bench, and face Judges,
Lawyers Doctors Priests and people,” but he added, “I arose with
confidence in Elijah’s God and gave them a brief history of the book
of Mormon.”8
Five years later, a larger group of Mormon elders gathered in
Kirtland, Ohio, then headquarters of the Mormon Church. They
made their way to the recently completed Kirtland Temple, which sat
on a bluff overlooking the Chagrin River flowing toward Lake Erie a
few miles to the north. The building differed markedly in its
religious significance from the New England churches that it
architecturally resembled. Anxious to avoid anything that smacked of
“Popery,” the Puritans had insisted that their meeting houses were
just that: places to meet without any special sanctification.9 The
4. See John A. Lupton, A. Lincoln, Esquire: The Evolution of a Lawyer, in A. LINCOLN,
ESQUIRE: A SHREWD, SOPHISTICATED LAWYER IN HIS TIME 18, 21 (Allen D. Spiegel ed.,
2002) (“Antebellum Illinois was a litigious society. . . . Legal issues included assault and
battery, bankruptcy, contract disputes, debt, divorce, medical malpractice, mortgage
foreclosure, personal injury, slander, and trespass.”).
5. See John W. Welch, The Acts of the Apostle William McLellin, in MCLELLIN, supra
note 1, at 13–26 (giving biographical information on McLellin and his companion).
6. The Manuscripts of William E. McLellin, in MCLELLIN supra note 1, at 39.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See James P. Walsh, Holy Time and Sacred Space in Puritan New England, 32 AM.
Q. 79 (1980) (discussing Puritan attitudes toward their meetings houses). See also Kevin M.
Sweeny, Meetinghouses, Town Houses, and Churches: Changing Perceptions of Sacred and Secular
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Mormon edifice, in contrast, had been dedicated in an elaborate set
of ceremonies that identified it with Old Testament temples, their
priestly ceremonies, and inner sanctuaries.10 In the dedicatory prayer,
Joseph Smith implored God that the temple “may be sanctified and
consecrated to be holy, and that thy holy presence may be
continually in this house; and that all people who shall enter upon
the threshold of the Lord’s house may feel thy power and feel
constrained to acknowledge that thou hast sanctified it, and that it is
thy house, a place of thy holiness.”11 Hence the Mormon elders who
made their way to the temple on March 29, 1837 were not simply
“going to meeting.” Rather, they were entering the sanctified center
of their religious community.12 Yet despite the geographic and
symbolic distance between them and the judges, lawyers, and village
rowdies of Morgan County, the Kirtland elders were also essentially a
judicial gathering. After opening with prayer, they turned to the case
of Cahoon v. Green. Elder Cahoon charged Elder Green “1st for
Disturbing the Sining Scoll several times 2nd for Swearing and
calling the Complainant a liar. . . .”13 Green denied the charge of
disturbing the peace, but admitted to the swearing and slander. After
considering and rejecting Green’s defense that Cahoon was, in fact, a
liar, the assembled elders voted to withdraw their fellowship from
him.14
The juxtaposition of Mormon elders preaching in the court
house and adjudicating in the temple illustrates the fluidity of the
boundaries between law and religion in nineteenth-century America.

Space in Southern New England, 1720–1850, 28 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 59 (1993)
(discussing the shift in attitudes towards churches in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
10. See generally Taylor Petrey, Christian Temple Builders and the Latter-day Saints, in
ARCHIVE OF RESTORATION CULTURE: SUMMER FELLOWS’ PAPERS 2000–2002, at 139
(Richard Lyman Bushman ed., 2005).
11. THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS § 109:12–13 (1989 ed.) [hereinafter DOCTRINE & COVENANTS]. The Doctrine
and Covenants consists of written revelations and teachings by Joseph Smith and a handful of
other Mormon prophets. It has been formally canonized by the Mormon Church and is
accepted by Mormons as scripture on par with the Bible and the Book of Mormon. It is divided
into “sections” which are then divided into “verses” in a manner similar to modern Bibles. All
references are to the section number and verse number.
12. Cf. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION
20–68 (1957) (discussing the role and function of sacred space).
13. KIRTLAND ELDERS’ QUORUM RECORD 1836–1841, at 25 (Lyndon W. Cook &
Milton V. Backman, Jr. eds., 1985).
14. Id. at 25–26.
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During the colonial period and the nineteenth century, numerous
religious groups sought to opt out of the secular legal system,
moving civil litigation between co-religionists into the hands of the
church.15 No group was entirely successful in doing so, but some—
particularly the Quakers and the Mormons—were able to forge
ecclesiastical courts16 that proved remarkably robust over long
periods of time. Their stories have been told as paeans to alternative
dispute resolution.17 Believers, so the explanations go, wished to
avoid the expense of formal litigation and turned to religious fora as
convenient alternatives to the courts. There is, of course, some truth
to this view. Yet McLellin’s injection of religion into the civic ritual
of court day, preaching from the bench to the judges, lawyers,
litigants, and spectators, and the relocation of adjudication to the
symbolic heart of their religion by the Kirtland elders problematizes
any attempt to reduce religious tribunals to simply another player in
15. See generally JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 19–47 (1983)
(discussing the resolution of civil disputes in religious fora).
16. Not all ecclesiastical tribunals called themselves “courts,” and I use the term
advisedly, as in some circumstances the border between adjudication and other activities such
as simple exhortation was porous. Martin Shapiro has argued that the essence of courts as an
institution lies in a tripartite structure in which there is a dispute between an accuser and
accused that is decided by some neutral third party. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1984) (“The root concept employed here is a
simple one of conflict structured in triads. Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that
whenever two persons come into conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one solution
appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution.”). I
mainly follow Shapiro, although I also refer to essentially inquisitorial institutions as courts
even though they may lack his tripartite structure.
17. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 15, at 19–47 (lauding ecclesiastical courts as
attractive alternatives to the civil court system); George S. Odiorne, Arbitration and Mediation
Among Early Quakers, 9 ARB. J. 161–66 (1954) (lauding the Quakers’ system of ecclesiastical
adjudication as an early example of alternative dispute resolution). Cf. WILLIAM M. OFFUTT,
JR., OF “GOOD LAWS” AND “GOOD MEN”: LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE DELAWARE VALLEY,
1680–1710, at 147 (1995) (referring to “panegyrics composed of anecdotal evidence on
alternative, community-based dispute resolution systems”). For discussions of the Mormon
ecclesiastical court system in the nineteenth century, see EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD
COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830–1900, at 263–370 (1988) (providing a detailed
summary of the functioning of Mormon ecclesiastical courts from 1846 to 1900); MARK P.
LEONE, ROOTS OF MODERN MORMONISM 111–48 (1979) (discussing ecclesiastical courts
among Mormon settlers in nineteenth-century Arizona); C. Paul Dredge, Dispute Settlement in
the Mormon Community: The Operation of Ecclesiastical Courts in Utah, in 4 ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: PATTERNS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT:
ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW 191 (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed., 1979) (discussing
ecclesiastical courts in early Utah); Raymond T. Swenson, Resolution of Civil Disputes by
Mormon Ecclesiastical Courts, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 573 (1978).
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the perpetual quest for low-cost dispute resolution. Rather, the move
to bring litigation within the fold of the church played out against a
much richer context of civic and religious symbols and institutions, a
fact powerfully illustrated by the Mormon experience.
The story of the rise and fall of the jurisdiction of Mormon
courts over ordinary civil disputes provides us with a number of
insights into the interaction between law and religion in nineteenthcentury America. It dramatically illustrates the fluidity of the
boundaries between law and religion early in the century and the
hardening of those boundaries by its end. The Mormon courts
initially arose in a context in which the professional bar had yet to
establish a monopoly over adjudication.18 Rather, churches felt
confident in their ability to create a “legal” apparatus of judges and
lawsuits.19 By century’s end, however, the increasing complexity of
the legal environment pushed the Mormon courts out of the
business of resolving civil disputes, hardening the boundaries around
the legal profession’s claimed monopoly over adjudication.20 Equally
important for the decline of the Mormon courts was the fact that
allegiance to the common-law courts became a prerequisite of
assimilation into the American mainstream. While hostility to the
secular courts had been a hallmark of a major stream of American
Protestantism during the colonial period and the first decades of the
Republic, by the end of the nineteenth century, Mormons’ rejection
of those courts marked them off as dangerous outsiders.21 Part of the
price of their acceptance into the national mainstream was the
abandonment of legal distinctiveness. The story of the Mormon
courts also illustrates the importance of law for the development of
religious beliefs and practices. Nineteenth-century Mormons
expended an enormous amount of theological and institutional
energy on legal issues. Other scholars have documented the “public
law” side of this story, showing how the federal government’s effort
to eradicate Mormon polygamy was central to Mormon experience
in the last half of the nineteenth century and ultimately forced a

18. See Dredge, supra note 17, at 193–97. See generally, FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra
note 17, at 25–58 (describing generally the rise of the Mormon court system).
19. Dredge, supra note 17, at 193, 198.
20. See id. at 198.
21. See id. (“Church leaders condemned courts and litigation . . . .”).
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revolution in Mormon beliefs and practices.22 The rise and fall of the
Mormon court system, however, shows that private law—subjects
like contract, tort, and property—could exercise no less of a power
over the religious imagination.
Finally, the story told here challenges the standard narrative
within Mormon history concerning the rise of the church court
system and the anti-legalism of nineteenth-century Latter-day Saints.
In their extensive study of civil disputes in Mormon ecclesiastical
courts, Professors Richard Collin Mangrum and Edwin Firmage
explain the genesis and rise of Mormon courts entirely in
terms of the internal imperatives of Mormon theology and
communitarianism.23 They write, “After they migrated to the deserts
of the Great Basin, the Saints pursued their radical theory of Zion as
an alternative to the social experiment of pluralistic America. A
critical part of this effort was the establishment and maintenance of
their own court system.”24 This narrative, however, unduly
emphasizes the uniqueness of the Mormon experience and fails to
acknowledge the important continuities between the Mormon court
system and the experience of discipline-oriented Protestant churches.
Accordingly, this Article emphasizes the way in which the emergence
of the Mormon court system must be seen within the broader
context of American and even Atlantic religious history. Only by
examining the Mormon courts in this broader context can we see the
way in which they both continued and sharply departed from earlier
ecclesiastical practices. Mangrum and Firmage, likewise, rightly
emphasize the anti-lawyer rhetoric of nineteenth-century Mormon
leaders but fail to appreciate the way in which Mormon attorneys
resisted their designation as social parasites.25 In contrast, this Article
shows how Latter-day Saint lawyers crafted their own legitimating
religious narratives, insisting that “true lawyers” could work
harmoniously within Mormon norms. In time, church leaders

22. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); Elizabeth
Harmer-Dionne, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon
Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295
(1998); Douglas H. Parker, Victory in Defeat—Polygamy and the Mormon Legal Encounter with
the Federal Government, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 805 (1991).
23. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 1–2.
24. Id. at 261.
25. Id. at 16–18, 271–74.
AND
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adopted this self-conception of Mormon attorneys in place of their
earlier blanket denunciations of the legal profession, and it provided
an important rhetorical bridge between the extensive jurisdiction of
church courts in the nineteenth century and their abandonment at
the beginning of the twentieth century.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows: Part I will
trace the origins of the Mormon court system, locating it within the
intellectual and theological context of early America. Part II will
discuss the effort to move civil litigation between Mormons into the
ecclesiastical courts. Finally, Part III will discuss the transformation
of Mormon adjudication, tracing the ultimate abandonment of
church-based litigation.
I. THE RISE OF THE MORMON JUDICIARY: 1526–1886
The Mormon court system emerged from the much older
tradition of ecclesiastical discipline among the English Protestants
who settled North America. Under English law, ecclesiastical courts
were integrated into the judicial machinery of the state. Certain
kinds of issues—mainly dealing with family law and certain aspects of
probate—lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Church of England.26 These courts enforced their decisions by
excommunicating recalcitrant parties, and excommunication would
then carry certain civil penalties.27 The Church of England, however,
made comparatively little effort to police the spiritual or moral purity
of church members.28 The assumption was that attempts to enforce
ecclesiastical purity through church discipline were unnecessary.
Indeed those who called for more aggressive church discipline were
labeled “Donatists” (after an early Christian sect condemned by
Augustine for their insistence on ecclesiastical purity) and treated as

26. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 114 (2d ed.
1979) (“The jurisdiction [of ecclesiastical courts] over marriage, divorce and probate lasted
until 1857. After 1857 the jurisdiction has been confined to Church matters, such as faculties
to alter or sell consecrated property and disciplinary proceedings against clergy.”).
27. According to William Blackstone:
[W]ith us by the common law an excommunicated person is disabled to do any act,
that is required to be done by one that is probus et legalis homo. He cannot serve
upon juries, cannot be a witness in any court, and, . . . cannot bring an action, either
real or personal, to recover lands or money due to him.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *102.
28. See id.
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dangerous heretics.29 Accordingly, the sanctions of church courts
were reserved for the ordinary legal cases falling within their
jurisdiction. Virginia and other colonies where Anglicanism was the
dominant religion continued this easy-going attitude toward church
discipline.30 Since they did not have bishops of their own, these
American churches came under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of
London. The geographic distance from ecclesiastical courts made it
all but impossible for them to exercise even ordinary functions, thus
strengthening the tendency to ignore problems of religious
impurity.31 Nor does this judicial neglect by the Church of England
seem to have bothered Virginians very much.32 For example, when
the Reverend James Blair, founder of The College of William and
Mary, tried to create local ecclesiastical courts to discipline “all
cursers Swearers and blasphemers, all whoremongers fornicators and
Adulterers, all drunkards ranters and profaners of the Lords day,” his
proposal was treated with horror by the planter elite and quickly
squashed.33
The English Protestants who founded the colonies to the north,
however, rejected the lax attitude of Anglicanism toward church
discipline.34 The roots of their dissatisfaction lay in a radical wing of
the German Reformation: the Anabaptists.35 In the sixteenth
century, the Anabaptists were most notable for their rejection of
infant baptism and the apocalyptic theocracy of the city of Munster,
which was bloodily suppressed by the local Catholic bishop in

29. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A PURITAN IDEA 2–4
(1963).
30. See STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 19–21 (Borzoi Books
1983).
31. See id. at 19 (“[C]olonies south of New England . . . failed to replicate the Anglican
ecclesiastical system . . . . The Church of England did not help matters along by trying to
govern colonial religious institutions out of the bishopric of London instead of creating a
diocese in the New World.”).
32. Id. at 19–20.
33. See id. at 20. Cf. Joseph C. Robert, Excommunication, Virginia Style, 40 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 243, 251 (1941) (noting that the discipline of Virginia’s Anglican churches was
known only for its laxity).
34. See Kenneth R. Davis, No Discipline, No Church: An Anabaptist Contribution to the
Reformed Tradition, 13 THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY J. 43 (1982).
35. See generally id. (discussing the Anabaptists’ influence on reforming trends of the
day).
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1535.36 The Anabaptists, however, also insisted that discipline was
the mark of a true church.37 In particular, they focused on the
eighteenth chapter of Matthew in which Christ commands, “If your
brother sins against you . . . tell it to the church; and if he refuses to
listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax
collector.”38 Adult baptism, insisted one Anabaptist pamphleteer in
1526, would be “no better than infant baptism had been if fraternal
admonition and excommunication did not go along with it.”39 In
Geneva, John Calvin regarded the Anabaptists as one of his chief
theological rivals, but he nevertheless imbibed their emphasis on
church discipline from an early teacher with strong Anabaptist
connections.40 (Calvin also married an Anabaptist widow.41) He
wrote, “as the saving doctrine of Christ is the soul of the church, so
does discipline serve as its sinews.”42 He did, however, try to
distinguish himself from “Donatists and Anabaptists” who “in an
impious schism separated themselves from Christ’s flock” and
“under the pretense of their zeal . . . subvert whatever edification
there is.”43 With the English break from Rome, Calvinist and
Anabaptist ideas made their way across the Channel. Among the
Puritan criticisms of the Anglican settlement was their insistence that
“every church should exclude and expel the wicked.”44
Like their Anglican cousins to the south, the Puritans of New
England dispensed with the courts of the Church of England,
moving matters of traditional ecclesiastical jurisdiction entirely into

36. See GEORGE HUNTSTON WILLIAMS, THE RADICAL REFORMATION 362–86 (1962)
(recounting the brief and violent history of the Munster theocracy). Some historians of
Mormonism have drawn parallels between the radical Anabaptists and the early Mormons. See,
e.g., D. Michael Quinn, Socio-religious Radicalism of the Mormon Church: A Parallel to the
Anabaptists, in NEW VIEWS OF MORMON HISTORY: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
LEONARD J. ARRINGTON 363 (Davis Bitton & Maureen Ursenbach Beecher eds., 1987).
37. See Davis, supra note 34, at 45.
38. Matthew 18:15–17 (RSV). See Davis, supra note 34, at 45. The Anabaptists also
relied on the parable of the wheat and the tares contained in Matthew 13. They insisted that
the parable applied only to the world and not the church, which could not include both
believers and unbelievers. Id. at 44.
39. Davis, supra note 34, at 47.
40. Id. at 56–57.
41. See PATRICK COLLINSON, THE REFORMATION 91 (2003).
42. JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1230 (John T. McNeill
ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westminster John Knox Press 1960) (1559).
43. Id. at 1239.
44. MORGAN, supra note 29, at 12.
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the secular courts.45 Their early insistence on the purity of the
church, however, meant that Puritans kept alive ecclesiastical
discipline, excommunicating church members who failed to live
godly lives.46 The practice of formal church discipline among
Puritans, however, was ultimately limited. Early Puritan theology
required that church members demonstrate that they had been
predestined to salvation, an exacting spiritual requirement that few
congregants met.47 Accordingly, few of the people in Puritan pews
were actually members of the church and therefore subject to its
discipline.48 The so-called Halfway Covenant, a form of partial
church membership, eventually relaxed the prerequisites for church
membership, increasing the number of congregants potentially
subject to discipline.49 However, the Halfway Covenant itself seems
to have dampened the fervor for ecclesiastical purity and with it the
widespread practice of church trials and excommunication.50
The same could not be said of the churches that sprouted among
dissenters from Puritan orthodoxy and other dissenting English
Protestants. Despite Calvinist antipathy toward Anabaptism, its ideas
and adherents found their way to New England in the first years of
settlement. English Separatists in Holland had come into contact
with Anabaptists in the Low Countries during the 1610s and 1620s,
and in 1638, Roger Williams established an early Baptist

45. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY OF JOHN
WINTHROP 95–96 (Oscar Handli ed., 1958) (“Though the ministers enjoyed a powerful
influence over their congregations, the shadow of Rome still lay heavily on the Puritans. None
of them wanted a ‘theocracy’ in the sense of government by the clergy. Indeed, of all the
governments in the Western world at the time, that of early Massachusetts gave the clergy least
authority.”). The relationship between ecclesiastical and secular courts in Puritan
Massachusetts was complicated. Although ecclesiastical courts had limited de jure authority,
secular courts punished offenses such as blasphemy, and on some issues—such as sumptuary
regulation—secular tribunals only stepped in when the church courts failed to deal with such
issues “at home.” See generally GEORGE LEE HASKIN, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY
MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 87–93 (1960).
46. See David C. Brown, The Keys of the Kingdom: Excommunication in Colonial
Massachusetts, 67 NEW ENG. Q. 531, 540–47 (1994).
47. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 64–112 (describing the development of church
membership among New England Puritans).
48. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 107–09 (discussing the varied reactions of settlers to
the newly imposed requirements of church membership).
49. See generally MORGAN, supra note 29, at 113–38 (discussing the history of the
Halfway Covenant).
50. Indeed, by the end of the seventeenth century, Puritan congregations largely ceased
to excommunicate their members. See Brown, supra note 46, at 556–57.
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congregation in Rhode Island that drew on this Separatist
tradition.51 From these beginnings, American Baptists spread around
the fringes of New England, and in the 1690s, Baptists from New
England formed the first Baptist congregation in the southern
colonies at Charleston, South Carolina.52 While divided in their
allegiance to Calvinist theology (some Baptists followed the Dutch
theologian Jacob Arminius, who rejected predestination), Baptists
retained the early Anabaptist conviction in the need to maintain the
purity of the church, and prior to the later part of the nineteenth
century, Baptist congregations aggressively disciplined their
members. Before 1840, eight percent of white male Baptists may
have “passed under the church’s rod of discipline” each year.53
The Quakers provide another instance of a well-developed
church judiciary emerging from the Radical Reformation. Quakerism
came out of the radical fringes of British Protestantism during the
religious and political upheavals that accompanied the English Civil
War.54 After decades of intermittent persecution in England, the
Quaker philanthropist William Penn established the colony of
Pennsylvania as a refuge for the Friends, as Quakers called
themselves. Like the radical New Englanders to their north, Quaker
congregations in America aggressively disciplined their members.55
The basic ecclesiastical unit was the so-called “Monthly Meeting,”
which would inquire into the actions of members and could formally
withdraw fellowship from those who did not live up to the standards
of the Society.56 Several monthly meetings were collected into socalled “Quarterly Meetings” and “Yearly Meetings,” which exercised
appellate jurisdiction as well as promulgated rules to govern church
discipline.57 In many ways, Quaker discipline was aggressive even by
the standards of discipline-oriented churches. For example, in

51. See BILL J. LEONARD, BAPTISTS IN AMERICA 8–9, 13–14 (2005).
52. See id. at 13–14.
53. GREGORY A. WILLS, DEMOCRATIC RELIGION: FREEDOM, AUTHORITY, AND
CHURCH DISCIPLINE IN THE BAPTIST SOUTH, 1785–1900, at 54 (1997).
54. See CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS
DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 186–207 (1972) (discussing the origins of Ranters and
Quakers).
55. See Jack Donald Marietta, Ecclesiastical Discipline in the Society of Friends, 1682–
1776, at 4–5 (1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the
author).
56. Id. at 1–2.
57. Id.
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addition to traditional concerns such as lying, swearing, or sexual
impropriety, Quakers were subject to discipline for traveling without
first informing their local “Meeting” or for failing to attend Quaker
services while visiting a different region.58
Scholars have long argued that the origins of Mormonism lie in
New England.59 Although the Church of Christ (later rechristened
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and referred to since
its inception as the Mormon Church) was organized in upstate New
York in April, 1830, its founder, Joseph Smith Jr., was born in
Vermont of old New England stock.60 Perhaps more importantly,
many of the earliest converts to the new faith in western New York
and Ohio were displaced New Englanders whose family roots lay in
the “radical fringe” of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
and Vermont, precisely the regions where Anabaptist and Quaker
influence were the strongest.61 Likewise, Joseph Smith found early
followers in Ohio and the upper reaches of the Susquehanna River,
regions peopled largely by settlers from Quaker Pennsylvania.62

58. See id. at 12–13.
59. See David Brion Davis, The New England Origins of Mormonism, 26 NEW ENG. Q.
147 (1953). Writing in the shadow of Perry Miller’s magisterial works on Puritan thought,
Davis conceptualized Mormonism as a populist—and somewhat silly—attempt to recapture
Puritanism in the nineteenth century. See id. at 158 (“Mormonism can be seen as the extreme
result of the evils of literal-mindedness. . . . This anachronistic residue of seventeenth-century
New England just did not understand the meaning of individualism.”); cf. Charles L. Cohen,
The Post-Puritan Paradigm of Early American Religious History, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 695, 701
(1997) (“Miller conceived of Puritanism as a fixed intellectual configuration . . . and he
diagnosed alterations in sentiment, doctrine, rhetoric, or practice as degeneration from this
initial scheme. Declension theory’s explanatory force derives from its deducing Puritanism as
an a priori unity from which every departure must necessarily signify decay.”).
60. See RICHARD LYMAN BUSHMAN, JOSEPH SMITH: ROUGH STONE ROLLING 8–29
(2005) (discussing the New England background of Joseph Smith Jr.’s family).
61. This theory of early Mormon demography was first advanced by John Brooke in
1994. See JOHN L. BROOKE, THE REFINER’S FIRE: THE MAKING OF MORMON COSMOLOGY,
1644–1844, at 59–88 (1994). Since then, Brooke’s demographic thesis has been significantly
supported by a much more comprehensive study by Val D. Rust. See VAL D. RUST, RADICAL
ORIGINS: EARLY MORMON CONVERTS AND THEIR COLONIAL ANCESTORS (2004). For a
sympathetic critique of Brooke’s interpretation of early Mormonism, see JAN SHIPPS, Thoughts
About the Academic Community’s Response to John Brooke’s Refiner’s Fire, in SOJOURNER IN
THE PROMISED LAND: FORTY YEARS AMONG THE MORMONS 204 (2000).
62. See BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 52–53 (discussing the genesis of the Colesville
branch). See also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FROM QUAKER TO LATTER-DAY SAINT 31 (1976)
(noting that in its early years Ohio took “half of her non-native increase from Pennsylvania”);
WHITNEY R. CROSS, THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASTIC RELIGION IN WESTERN NEW YORK, 1800–1850, at 4 (1950)
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These early converts carried their forbearers’ emphasis on church
discipline into the new movement. The earliest rules for the
government of the church were contained in the “Articles of the
Church of Christ” composed in late 1829.63 The “Articles” endorsed
the baptism of adult believers and insisted on the importance of
disciplining recalcitrant members.64 “Therefore if ye know that a man
is unworthy” they stated, “. . . if he repenteth not he shall not be
numbered among my people that he may not destroy my people.”65
A few months later, the newly organized church adopted an
expanded “Articles and Covenants.” This document directed that
“[a]ny member of the church of Christ transgressing, or being
overtaken in a fault, shall be dealt with as the scriptures direct . . .
[a]nd also, if any have been expelled from the church . . . their
names may be blotted out of the general church record of names.”66
The emphasis on ecclesiastical purity and church discipline meant
that adjudication emerged almost immediately as an important facet
of Mormon religious experience. The earliest judicial procedures
used by the Latter-day Saints, however, cannot be found in the
quasi-constitutional “Articles and Covenants.” Rather, the Mormons
simply adopted procedures used by other discipline-oriented
churches. Prior to any formal action, teachers “labored” with
refractory members, urging them to confess their transgressions
without formal disciplinary action.67 If this did not work, then the

(noting that in western New York, where Mormonism was founded, “a reasonably large
proportion of folk came up the Susquehanna from Pennsylvania”).
63. See Scott H. Faulring, An Examination of the 1829 “Articles of the Church of Christ”
in Relation to Section 20 of the Doctrine and Covenants, BYU STUD., Winter 2004, at 57. The
full text of the “Articles of the Church of Christ” is reproduced in Faulring’s article.
64. See id. at 77 (“Now therefore whosoever repenteth and humbleth himself before me
[that is, Jesus Christ] and desireth to be baptized in my name shall ye baptize them.”)
(quoting the Transcript of the 1829 Articles of the Church of Christ) (brackets not in
original).
65. Id. at 78.
66. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 20:80, 83.
67. For example, the business of an 1834 meeting of teachers in Kirtland consisted
entirely of appointing brethren to labor with particular members: “[T]he conference then
appointed brothers John Taylor and Benjamin Johnson to labor with Orva Cartwright for
making use of tobacco, also brother Joseph Ceehum (?) was appointed to labor with broth
Bates & wife also brothers G. Johnson & A.C. Graves was appointed to labor with the widow
Shaw.” Teachers Quorum Minutes, Dec. 1834–Dec. 1845, Church Archives, The Family and
Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City,
Utah. See also FAR WEST RECORD: MINUTES OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS, 1830–1844, at 38 (Donald Q. Cannon & Lyndon W. Cook eds., 1983)
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erring brother or sister would be brought before the local
“conference” for trial.68 These proceedings were presided over by a
“moderator” who was elected for the meeting.69 The moderator was
a familiar character from both Protestant churches and New England
town meetings, and his purpose was less to act as a judge than to run
the meeting. Generally, the moderator among Protestants was the
minister, but with an entirely lay clergy, the office seems to have
rotated from meeting to meeting among the Mormons.70 There were
no formal evidentiary or procedural rules. Rather, evidence was
presented by the parties in the case.71 The assembled members would
then vote on the verdict.72 The congregational basis and the
vocabulary used by these earliest Mormon courts were very similar to
meetings of Baptists or Quakers.73
While this early pattern of church discipline was retained
throughout the nineteenth century by Latter-day Saints in Europe
and the British Isles,74 the Mormon judiciary rapidly began diverging
from its Protestant antecedents in ways that reflected the religious
radicalism of Mormonism. Joseph Smith had founded his church on
the claim that God had chosen him to “restore” the Christian gospel

[hereinafter FAR WEST RECORD] (a conference voted two elders to mediate between two
quarrelling members).
68. See, e.g., FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 15 (“Ezra being absent . . . Cowdery
be dispatched . . . [to] bring him before this conference immediately.”).
69. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“Br Sidney Rigdon appointed moderator.”).
70. See, e.g., id. at 26–31 (between November 1, 1831 and November 13, 1831 there
were six conference meetings in Kirtland all with different moderators). However, the role of
moderator seems to have attached fairly quickly to particular priesthood officers. See, e.g., id. at
65 (“The Bishop Edward Partridge was acknowledged to be at the head of the Church of Zion
at present consequently will be our Moderator in councils or conferences by virtue of his
office.”).
71. See, e.g., id. at 15 (“After hearing the relations of all the parties, the conference
requested them to withdraw while they should investigate the testimony & pass their
decision.”).
72. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“Upon testimony satisfactory to this conference it was voted that
Ezra Booth be silenced from preaching as an Elder in this Church.”).
73. Presbyterian tribunals were different, however, for they accorded the minister
greater power and restricted adjudication to a council of elders chosen by a vote of the
congregation. See GLENN C. ALTSCHULER & JAN M. SALTZGABER, REVIVALISM, SOCIAL
CONSCIENCE, AND COMMUNITY IN THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE TRIAL OF RHODA
BEMENT 151 (1983).
74. See Richard L. Jensen, Church Councils and Governance, in MORMONS IN EARLY
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 179 (Richard L. Jensen & Malcolm R. Thorp eds., 1989). The first
Mormon missionaries arrived in England in 1837, and the new religion garnered tens of
thousands of converts in Great Britain and Scandinavia over the following decades.
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in its original purity.75 Hence, in some sense, Mormonism was simply
an extreme manifestation of the basic Protestant anxiety about the
corruption of the Christian church.76 In other respects, however, the
new movement broke radically with the Protestant tradition from
which it emerged. First, Smith insisted that he was not a reformer
but rather a prophet on the biblical model who received knowledge
directly from angelic visitors and waking theophanies.77 On this basis,
Smith claimed the right to add additional scripture to the biblical
canon, which he did first with the Book of Mormon and subsequently
in a series of written “revelations” given in response to specific
questions or problems.78 Second, Smith rejected the notion of a
priesthood of believers, insisting instead that authentic ecclesiastical
authority could come only by the “laying on of hands” by those who
could trace their authority through an unbroken chain of ordination
back to Christ, authority that Smith claimed to have received from
visiting angels.79 Both of these claims marked Mormonism as a
heretical sect in the eyes of American Protestantism, and both of
them contributed to the unique elaboration of the Mormon
judiciary.

75. See generally JAN SHIPPS, MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS
TRADITION 67–85 (1985) (discussing Mormon restorationism).
76. See id. at 68 (“[U]nless the radical character of the Mormon restoration is taken into
account, and unless careful attention is paid to the particular way in which Mormonism was
shaped and transformed by the actual practical experience of the community of belief,
Mormonism can all too readily be misunderstood as a little more than an elaborate
idiosyncratic strain of the nineteenth-century search for primitive Christianity.”).
77. To contemporary ears, Smith’s repeated claims to visions and revelations sound
startling and unique, marking him off to modern Mormons as a miraculous figure and many
non-Mormons as a transparent fraud. See Jan Shipps, The Prophet Puzzle: Suggestions Leading
Toward a More Comprehensive Interpretation of Joseph Smith, J. OF MORMON HIST., Vol.1,
1974, at 3 (discussing the problem of the prophet-fraud dichotomy in the context of Joseph
Smith and early Mormonism). However, while Joseph Smith was certainly recognized as a
religious radical and accused of being an imposter in his own lifetime, he nevertheless operated
in a religious milieu in which claims to visions and visiting angels were frequent, indeed
commonplace. See Richard Bushman, The Visionary World of Joseph Smith, BYU STUD., Spring
1997–98, at 183 (discussing the role that stories of visions and angels played in the religious
economy of Jacksonian America).
78. Many of these revelations were subsequently collected and published in the Doctrine
and Covenants, both within Joseph Smith’s lifetime and in subsequent editions of the Doctrine
and Covenants produced after his death.
79. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 13 (Joseph Smith’s account of the restoration of
priesthood authority by an angel). See generally GREGORY A. PRINCE, POWER FROM ON HIGH:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORMON PRIESTHOOD (1995) (discussing the theological and
institutional development of the Mormon idea of priesthood).
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Smith’s position as prophet and conduit of priesthood authority
centralized a great deal of ecclesiastical power in his hands. Equally,
if not more important, however, was the way in which Smith
dispersed prophetic and priestly authority. He insisted that everyone
had the right to receive personal revelation from God and essentially
all Latter-day Saint males were given the priesthood. He also set up a
slew of independent councils that were to receive revelation and
direct affairs within their appointed areas.80 The result was the
widespread dispersal of authority away from Joseph Smith. As his
biographer has observed, “Joseph’s presence was not required to
make [the councils] work. Instead of councils relying on him to give
the last word, they met, deliberated, and made policy decisions in his
absence.”81 Much of the work done by these councils was
adjudicative, either inquiring into the worthiness of individual
Mormons accused of sin or settling disputes between Mormons.82 As
a result, Mormon ideas of personal revelation and priesthood
authority became intertwined with the emerging Mormon judiciary,
which was divided into various specialized councils as opposed to the
earlier congregational procedures.
These special councils began developing early in the history of
the new movement. In 1831 Joseph Smith made Edward Partridge a
“bishop.”83 Thereafter, other men were ordained to the same office.
Initially, the bishops were associated only with the “temporal affairs
of the church,” namely the emerging experiments with communal
economics among Mormons in Ohio and Missouri.84 The bishop
also, however, became a judicial officer. For example, an 1835
revelation stated that he was “to be a judge in Israel . . . to sit in
judgment upon transgressors upon testimony as it shall be laid
before him according to the laws.”85 In addition, as Smith elaborated

80. Richard Lyman Bushman, The Theology of Councils, in REVELATION, REASON, AND
FAITH: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TRUMAN G. MADSEN 433, 439–41 (Donald W. Parry et al. eds.,
2002).
81. Id. at 433, 440; see also id. at 443 (“In bringing conciliar government into being,
Joseph not only distributed authority to the councils, but he dispensed the divine gift of
revelation as well.”).
82. Id. at 440–41.
83. See BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 254.
84. See LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830–1900, at 6–17 (1958) [hereinafter ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN
KINGDOM] (discussing early Mormon communitarianism and the role of bishops).
85. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:72.
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various priesthood offices—deacons, teachers, priests, elders,
seventies, and high priests—the men in a given area holding each
office gathered in quasi-fraternal organizations called “priesthood
quorums.”86 Each of these quorums was presided over by a
president, and the quorum as a body had limited judicial authority.
Although it could not excommunicate an erring brother, it could
formally withdraw the fellowship of the quorum, and adjudication
emerged as one of their main activities.87
Smith also established a series of superior councils that eventually
gelled into a two-tiered appellate structure for the church judiciary.
In 1832, he announced a revelation creating a body called “the First
Presidency” consisting of himself and two counselors, which would
acquire final appellate jurisdiction in the church.88 In 1834, Smith
further refined the Mormon judiciary by creating a body known as
“the High Council,” a group of twelve high priests presided over by
a president, which was to settle “important difficulties which might
arise in the church, which could not be settled by the church or the
bishop’s council to the satisfaction of the parties.”89 A year later,
Smith underlined the centrality of discipline and adjudication to the
emerging ecclesiastical structure by announcing a revelation creating
a special procedure for excommunicating the President of the
Church (Smith himself) should it become necessary, that “none shall
be exempted from the justice and the laws of God, that all things
may be done in order and in solemnity before him, according to
truth and righteousness.”90

86. See generally DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 20:38–67, 107 (outlining the
responsibilities of the quorums).
87. See generally KIRTLAND ELDERS’ QUORUM RECORD 1836–1841 (Lyndon W. Cook
& Milton V. Backman, Jr. eds., 1985) (recording numerous disciplinary actions by the Kirtland
Elders’ Quorum). See also Proceedings Before the Committee on Privileges and Elections of the
United States Senate in the Matter of the Protests Against the Right of Hon. Reed Smoot, a
Senator from the State of Utah, to Hold His Seat, S. Doc. No. 486, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906)
at 3:23 [hereinafter Smoot Hearings] (testimony by James E. Talmage stating that “[a]fter
proper trial any quorum may disfellowship one of its members”).
88. See generally DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 81.
89. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 102:2.
90. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:84. The sometimes fluid nature of the Mormon
judiciary is illustrated by the disagreements over the years about precisely how the procedure
for excommunicating the President of the Church should work. At a meeting of the Twelve
Apostles and the First Presidency on December 24, 1902, Apostle Rudger Clawson recorded:
Elder Smoot [that is, Reed Smoot] said that there was a diversity of opinion in Utah
Stake as to who would sit in judgment if the President of the church were placed on
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However, while the refinement of the Mormon judiciary pushed
adjudication away from the earlier congregational model into
specialized tribunals, the possibility of trial by a general vote of the
membership remained. Joseph Smith taught that “[w]hen there is no
Bishop, [those subject to discipline] are to be tried by the voice of
the Church.”91 Similarly, extraordinary cases could be decided by a
general vote of the church even when other tribunals were
functioning. For example, in 1886 Joseph Q. Cannon, then a
counselor to the Presiding Bishop of the Church, was
excommunicated for adultery by vote of “the public congregation in
the Big Tabernacle.”92
trial. Some claimed that it would be the right of the Presiding Bishopric to try him.
Elder Smoot said he did not coincide with this view. The matter might be
considered inappropriate for discussion, but he thought the council ought to be
agreed as touching this question. Elder Smoot said that the revelation which
directed that in case the President of the High Priesthood should [be] put upon
trial, the Presiding Bishop associated with twelve high priests should constitute the
trial court, was given before the church was fully organized and before the Twelve
had been chosen. Pres. Smith [that is, Joseph F. Smith] suggested that the matter be
taken under advisement for one week, which was done.
A MINISTRY OF MEETINGS: THE APOSTOLIC DIARIES OF RUDGER CLAWSON 525–26 (Stan
Larson ed., 1993) (second brackets in original). Clawson did not record the outcome of the
special committee. However, in 1904, Joseph F. Smith, a nephew of Joseph Smith, Jr. and
then President of the Church, testified before the U.S. Senate as part of the controversy
surrounding the seating of Mormon Senator Reed Smoot. Responding to questions by the
Senators, he stated that he could be tried for his membership before his local bishop’s court
like any other member, with appeal lying to his stake president, and from thence to a special
council. See Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 1:352. In an influential work on church
government published a few decades later, however, Mormon apostle John A. Widtsoe
described a special procedure based on the 1835 revelation to Joseph Smith, Jr. See JOHN A.
WIDTSOE, PRIESTHOOD AND CHURCH GOVERNMENT 217 (1939).
91. PRINCE, supra note 79, at 198 (citation omitted).
92. AN APOSTLE’S RECORD: THE JOURNALS OF ABRAHAM H. CANNON 85–86 (Dennis
B. Horne, ed. 2004). In his 1904 testimony before the Senate, James E. Talmage also
suggested that a vote of the general conference of the church also constituted a method of
extraordinary appeal:
An appeal would lie from the first presidency to the assembled quorums of the
priesthood; that is to say, the church as a body is the supreme court before which
the cases involving church [sic].
The assembled quorums or organizations of the priesthood may be said to be
in session at every general conference of the church. But, of course, in the same
assembly with the quorums of the priesthood standing and church rights may be
tried.
Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 3:21 (testimony of James E. Talmage). See also T.B.H.
STENHOUSE, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN SAINTS 564–66 (1873) (“[T]here is also an appeal to
the ‘quorum’ of the ‘First Presidency,’ and from that, if desired, to the Church collectively in
General Conference.”).
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The proliferating councils eventually settled into a single
integrated judicial structure. In 1838, after years of intermittent
violence, the Mormons were driven out of Missouri and settled in
Illinois along the banks of the Mississippi river where they founded
the City of Nauvoo. Eventually a bishop was assigned to each of
Nauvoo’s municipal wards, mainly to look after the needs of the
poor and to provide a bishop’s court for local members. These
bishops were under the direction of the President of the Nauvoo
Stake of Zion and his High Council. This High Council had
appellate jurisdiction over decisions by the bishop’s courts and local
priesthood quorums, as well as original jurisdiction in difficult
cases.93 Other areas of concentrated Mormon settlement were
organized into other “stakes” with a similar judicial structure.94 In
some cases, the High Council had a president who was different than
the president of the stake.95 For much of the nineteenth century,
there were also “traveling bishops” who operated independent of
particular wards or congregations.96 The First Presidency then
exercised appellate jurisdiction over all of the various High Councils.
In addition, certain councils, such as the Presiding Bishopric,
retained jurisdiction independent of stake organizations.97 With
minor refinements, this three-tiered structure of bishops’ courts,
High Councils, and the First Presidency has survived in the Mormon
Church to the present day.98

93. See generally William G. Hartley, Nauvoo Stake, Priesthood Quorums, and the
Church’s First Wards, BYU STUD., Spring 1991 (illustrating examples of High Council
appellate jurisdiction in Nauvoo).
94. A Mormon “stake” is an ecclesiastical structure consisting of several congregations—
called “wards”—and is roughly equivalent to a Roman Catholic diocese.
95. See William G. Hartley, Brigham Young and Priesthood Work at the General and
Local Levels, in LION OF THE LORD: ESSAYS ON THE LIFE & SERVICE OF BRIGHAM YOUNG
338, 358 (Susan Easton Black & Larry C. Porter eds., 1995).
96. See id.
97. The office of “Presiding Bishopric” is independent of the office of an ordinary
bishop. After the Nauvoo period, bishops emerged as essentially congregational leaders,
although local ecclesiastical structures remained quite fluid into the late 1870s. However,
Joseph Smith published a revelation in 1841 creating an office of Presiding Bishop, who was to
oversee the temporal affairs of the Church at a general level. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS §
124:20–21, 141. See also Hartley, supra note 95, at 356–58 (discussing the evolution of the
office of Presiding Bishopric).
98. For many years there was a fourth level in the appellate structure: the Salt Lake Stake
was considered “the center Stake of Zion” and the Salt Lake High Council had appellate
jurisdiction over other High Councils, which placed it in a position between the ordinary High
Councils and the First Presidency. See Hartley, supra note 95, at 359.
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Unlike the Protestant structures from which it emerged, the
mature Mormon judiciary was more than simply a congregationally
based method of policing ecclesiastical purity. It was a single,
institutionally integrated system that was ideologically related to key
aspects of Mormon theology. In February, 1834, the Kirtland High
Council met and “[Brother] Joseph . . . said he would show the
order of councils in ancient days . . . as shown him by vision the law
by which to govern the Council of the Church of Christ.”99 Smith
went on to explain that “Jerusalem was the seat of the Church
Council in ancient days” and that the procedures he was instituting
were those that had been used by the apostle Peter, who “was
appointed to this office by the voice of the Savior.”100 In reaching
their decisions, the council was to “speak precisely according to the
evidence and according to the teaching of the Spirit of the Lord.”101
Likewise, “in cases of difficulty respecting doctrine or principles if
there is not a sufficiency written to make clear to the mind of the
council, the president may inquire and obtain the mind of the Lord
by Revelation.”102 The institutional structure of Mormon courts was
thus central to the theological narrative of pristine Christianity and
authentic priestly authority restored in the latter days. Likewise, the
process of decision making in Mormon courts explicitly rested on
claims to continuing and immediate revelation from God. In short,
Mormon courts became a key location in which Latter-day Saints
experienced the divine and enacted the theological narratives that
structured their religious beliefs. When the Kirtland Elders Quorum
chose the Temple as the location to hear the case of Cahoon v. Green
they were giving concrete expression to this central religious role of
adjudication.
II. SUING BEFORE THE UNGODLY AND SUING BEFORE THE
CHURCH
A suspicion of secular courts and preference for church tribunals
emerged within the first generation of Christianity. In his first letter

99. Kirtland High Council Minutes (Dec. 1834–Nov. 1837), Church Archives, The
Family and Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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to the Corinthians, Paul rebuked the early Christians for their
litigiousness, noting with horror that “brother goes to law against
brother, and that before unbelievers.”103 He asked rhetorically,
“When one of you has a grievance against a brother, does he dare to
go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints?”104 These
passages from the New Testament captured the imagination of
discipline-minded churches. The emphasis of these churches on
ecclesiastical purity meant that adjudication was already an important
part of their religious experience. Equipped with the institutional
machinery and social practices to manage lawsuits between members,
they combined Paul’s attack on litigation with a deep-seated
suspicion of the common-law courts. The result was a series of
attempts to create religious alternatives to the civil courts, of which
the Mormon judiciary became an exemplar.
The Puritans made some attempts to resolve civil litigation in
church courts. For example, in 1635 the First Church of Boston
excommunicated one of its members “for extortion, deceipt [sic],
and lying, in and about Iron Worke which he made for one Mr.
Jacob.”105 In the end, however, Puritan churches did not become
heavily involved in resolving civil cases for the same reasons that their
church discipline as a whole was less vigorous than other sects. Early
Puritan congregations were made up mainly of non-members and
the theological accommodation marked by the Half-way Covenant
dampened the practice of church adjudication.106 Congregationalist
churches, however, did provide arbitrators from time to time,107 and
as late as the 1840s Presbyterian churches, which merged with the
Congregationalists under the 1801 Plan of Union, “frequently
viewed questionable business practices, even if technically legal, as
breaches of discipline.”108 Baptists were even more aggressive in
using their disciplinary machinery to resolve civil disputes:
Rules prohibited quarreling, litigation between fellow members
without church consent, the evasion of just debts, especially by

103. 1 Corinthians 6:6 (RSV).
104. 1 Corinthians 6:1 (RSV).
105. HASKIN, supra note 45, at 90.
106. See MORGAN, supra note 29, at 2–4.
107. See, e.g., THE ADAMS PAPERS: THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 20–21 (L.
Kinvin & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1968) (discussing a dispute over timber submitted to
arbitration before a church committee).
108. ALTSCHULER & SALTZGABER, supra note 73, at 155.
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taking advantage of the statute of limitations in order to
circumvent legal collection. An important function of the church
was to serve as a jury in the settlement of difficulties among its
members . . . . 109

The Quakers initially absented themselves from the English legal
system because their literal interpretation of Christ’s injunction,
“swear not,”110 meant that they refused to take the oaths that formed
a necessary part of common-law procedure.111 The result was a turn
away from the secular courts and toward what the Quakers called
“The Gospel Order,” a comprehensive system for resolving intraQuaker disputes without litigation.112 For example rules adopted by
the New England Yearly Meeting in 1697 stated that “when any
friend or friends shall hear of any . . . difference betwixt any friends .
. . they [shall] forthwith speak to and tenderly advise, the persons
between whom the differences is, to make a speedy end thereof.”113
If friendly persuasion did not work, the rules called for ad hoc
arbitrators. “[T]hey should each choose an equal number of
different, impartial and judicious friends, to hear and speedily
determine the same; and that they do bind themselves to stand to
their award and determination.”114 The Gospel Order, however,
placed onerous sanctions on any Quaker who instituted a civil
lawsuit against another “friend” without submitting the dispute to
arbitration: “[I]f any person professing truth with us, shall . . .
sue . . . at law, any other of our members, before he hath proceeded
in the methods herein before recommended . . . then he be
disowned by the meeting.”115
Any Quaker thus disciplined could appeal to the quarterly and
yearly meetings.116 Although there is reason to suppose that intraQuaker litigation was considerably more common than the “Gospel

109. Robert, supra note 33, at 248 (describing church discipline among eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Baptists).
110. Matthew 5:34 (KJV).
111. OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 147.
112. Id. See also Odiorne, supra note 17, at 161 (describing arbitration proceedings
among the Quakers).
113. SOCIETY OF FRIENDS NEW ENGLAND YEARLY MEETING, RULES OF DISCIPLINE OF
THE YEARLY MEETING HELD ON RHODE ISLAND FOR NEW ENGLAND 3–4 (1849).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5–6.
116. Id. at 1 (setting forth the procedures in appeals).
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Order” would suggest,117 one nineteenth-century author insisted
that “[c]ases, where property is concerned to the amount of many
thousands, are determined” according to the Gospel Order.118
The earliest recorded case of a civil dispute in a Mormon tribunal
was an action for debt, resolved by an Indiana conference in
December 1831. The minutes of the meeting record that “Brs.
George Heartley & Oliver Walker then withdrew to settle the
difficulty between themselves but could not agree[.] Therefore
decided that two should be appointed by the Moderator.”119 After an
attempt at mediation failed, the parties “agreed to abide the decision
of John & Thomas who concluded that Oliver Walker pay George
Heartly which was his just due.”120 The decision of the arbitrators
“was laid before the Conference,” and it was only with “much
cavilling” that the losing party was persuaded “to stand or hold fast
to his agreement.”121 In the end, however, “they came together as
brothers and disciples & all matters were settled & buried.”122
Mormon courts soon moved from arbitration for two willing
parties to direct jurisdiction over a case. A strikingly high proportion
of these earliest complaints were for defamation of one kind or
another. For example, in December 1833 Joseph Smith heard a
complaint against a
Bro. Ezekiel Rider . . . who had said many hard things against Bro.
Whitney, the Bishop of the Church—he said that Bro. Whitney was
not fit for a Bishop and that he treated the Brethren who came into
the store with disrespect that he was overbearing and fair would
walk on the necks of the Brethren &c.123

In the Quaker context, it has been theorized that the heavy
preponderance of defamation cases in the ecclesiastical docket
117. See OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 174–81 (providing a demographic analysis of
litigation in the Delaware valley suggesting widespread intra-Quaker lawsuits).
118. THOMAS CLARKSON, A PORTRAITURE OF QUAKERISM: TAKEN FROM A VIEW OF
THE EDUCATION AND DISCIPLINE, SOCIAL MANNERS, CIVIL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY,
RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES, AND CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS 70 (1806).
119. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 38.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Interestingly, this earliest foray of Mormon tribunals into arbitration does not
seem to have been entirely successful. Cannon and Cook write, “Although the problem was
considered ‘buried’ at this conference, it surfaced again and was a matter of business in
Kirtland in December 1834.” Id. at 38 n.4.
123. Kirtland High Council Minutes, supra note 99.
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reflects procedural advantages offered by church courts. A plaintiff
bringing such an action in a secular court risked a defendant who
“attempt[ed] to prove the truth of the alleged defamatory statement,
broadcasting to the court day crowd further attacks on the plaintiff’s
reputation.”124 While nineteenth-century Mormon courts were not
entirely private affairs, they could offer a less glaringly public
rehearsal of the original insults. In addition, early Mormons operated
in an often violent frontier “culture of honor” that “bred deep
loyalties to friends and family while instilling a fierce urge to avenge
insults.”125 Church courts provided a way of managing the conflict
this culture created by transforming insults from a private causus belli
into ecclesiastical litigation.
During the 1830s, church courts heard increasing numbers of
cases involving civil claims such as actions for debt, but the “secular”
issues in these disputes were frequently tied up in religious and
political struggles of central importance to the church. For example,
after Mormons were violently pushed out of Jackson County,
Missouri, one Mormon lawyer found himself disciplined after
agreeing to represent Jackson County non-Mormons trying to
collect debts against fellow Mormons.126 After the Mormons moved
to Illinois, they dominated political and legal offices in Nauvoo.
Joseph Smith was elected mayor and served as a judge, studying law
for a time and boasting that “I am a lawyer; I am a big lawyer and
comprehend heaven, earth and hell, to bring forth knowledge that
shall cover up all lawyers, doctors and other big bodies.”127 He also,
however, preached that “as long as I have a tongue to speak I will
expose the iniquity of the Lawyiers [sic] and wicked men.”128 Also,
for the first time in Nauvoo, church courts began treating the mere
filing of a civil lawsuit by one Mormon against another Mormon as a
matter for discipline. Using a formula that would be repeated
countless times in succeeding decades, in November 1842 a member

124. OFFUTT, supra note 17, at 172.
125. BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 295. Cf. DAVID HACKET FISCHER, ALBION’S SEED:
FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN AMERICA 765–71 (1989) (discussing honor and violence among
backcountry settlers).
126. See FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 163.
127. TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH 279 (Joseph Fielding Smith ed.
1967).
128. WORDS OF JOSEPH SMITH: THE CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF THE NAUVOO
DISCOURSES OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH 324 (Andrew F. Ehat & Lyndon W. Cook eds., 1980).
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filed a complaint with the Nauvoo High Council to “prefer a
charge” for “instituting a suit at Law against me,” an action
“derogatory to the character of a Christian.”129
These church councils became increasingly important as the
Mormons were driven west in the 1840s. A mob murdered Joseph
Smith in 1844, and the Mormons abandoned Nauvoo in 1846.
Their final destination was the valley of the Great Salt Lake, but they
first crossed Iowa to the banks of the Missouri River and founded a
temporary settlement dubbed “Winter Quarters.” Brigham Young,
Joseph Smith’s successor, established the “Municipal High Council”
to govern the settlement. Formally identical to earlier High
Councils, the Winter Quarter’s High Council exercised an extremely
expansive jurisdiction, resolving all civil disputes and meting out
criminal punishments.130 When the vanguard of Mormons arrived in
the Salt Lake Valley in 1847, they replicated this system. John Smith
was made president of the Salt Lake Stake with a High Council that
exercised both civil and criminal authority. The Mormons made an
early bid for statehood, drafting a constitution modeled on that of
Illinois and setting up a government for the provisional “State of
Deseret” in 1849.131 By early 1850, the courts of Deseret took over
from the Salt Lake High Council. Hence from 1846 until 1850,
Mormons lived under High Councils that had full civil and criminal
power.
Congress rejected the State of Deseret and organized the
Territory of Utah as part of the Compromise of 1850, providing the
legal context in which the Mormon courts operated for more than
four decades.132 The Territorial Legislature was locally elected and
dominated by Mormons.133 The Territorial Supreme Court, in
contrast, was staffed with non-Mormon federal appointees, as was

129. Nauvoo Stake High Council Court Papers (1839–44), n.1, Church Archives,
(available at The Family and Church History Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah).
130. See Edward L. Kimball & Kenneth W. Godfrey, Law and Order in Winter Quarters,
J. MORMON HIST. Spring 2006, at 180–81 (discussing the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the Winter Quarter’s High Council).
131. See generally DALE MORGAN, THE STATE OF DESERET 7–29 (1987) (discussing the
manner in which the Mormons formed the State of Deseret and appealed for statehood);
PETER CRAWLEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF DESERET (1982).
132. See generally Eugene Campbell, Governmental Beginnings, in UTAH’S HISTORY 153
(Richard D. Poll et al. eds. 1978) (discussing the creation of Utah Territory).
133. See id. at 160–64.
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the territorial executive after President James Buchanan replaced
Brigham Young as Territorial Governor in 1857.134 The treatment of
civil cases by the High Councils, however, showed basic continuity
throughout the period. Plaintiffs filed simple written complaints with
the clerk of the bishop’s court or High Council.135 Clerks issued
summons to the defendants.136 Defendants who refused to appear
risked disfellowshipment or excommunication for “contempt of the
priesthood.”137 The parties presented evidence, and the council
issued decisions.138 Appeals could be taken to the High Council and
the First Presidency, which both tried cases de novo.139 A Mormon
sued by another Mormon in a secular court could file a countercomplaint before a church court alleging “unChristian-like
conduct.”140 The church court would then take jurisdiction over the
entire dispute and resolve the underlying lawsuit on the merits.141
Failure to carry the church judiciary’s final decision into effect
resulted in excommunication.142
As might be expected, losing parties were not always satisfied
with the decisions of church courts. For example, in 1847 when one
victorious plaintiff called at a defendant’s house to claim property to
which the high council had declared him entitled, the irate defendant
responded, “The Council might go to hell and be damned[!]”143 In
another case, a diarist recorded that a losing party in a high council
case “was dissatisfied with their judgment and told them that it was
no better than robery [sic].”144 However, one non-Mormon observer

134. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 142, 244.
135. See generally id. at 29–34 (discussing the organization of bishops’ courts and High
Councils).
136. See id. at 29–30 (discussing the process of issuing summons through clerks).
137. See id. at 289 (discussing sanctions for refusals to submit to the jurisdiction of
church courts).
138. See id. at 283 (discussing evidentiary rules).
139. See id. at 285–87 (discussing appellate procedures).
140. See id. at 264–67 (discussing one representative dispute spanning both secular and
church courts).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 287–88 (discussing sanctions for non-compliance with church court
requirements).
143. THE OLD FORT: HISTORIC MORMON BASTION, THE PLYMOUTH ROCK OF THE
WEST 82 (Nicholas Groesbeck Morgan, Sr. ed. 1964) (showing the reprinted minutes from
the Great Salt Lake City High Council).
144. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER: THE DIARY OF HOSEA STOUT 1844–1861, at 433
(Juanita Brooks ed. 1964) [hereinafter 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER].
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insisted that “[i]n ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the parties are
satisfied.”145 Indeed, occasionally, “Gentiles,” as Mormons called
non-Mormons, sued Mormons in church courts rather than secular
fora. For example, in one case an influential bishop had run-up
several thousand dollars of debt to a Gentile merchant. The
merchant “brought suit against the bishop in [a church court] in
preference to going to law.”146 After a ninety-minute trial, the
church court ruled that “the bishop should pay the full amount
within twenty-eight days, or be suspended from his bishopric.”147
The merchant was satisfied with the decision and offered to pay
court costs “which [was] declined, for suits in this court were
without costs.”148
Although church courts referred to “the law of the Church” and
“the law of the Lord,” it was unclear what rules—if any—they
looked to in resolving cases. The basic procedures used by the high
councils had been given by Joseph Smith in 1834 and remained
quite stable. During the period of 1846 to 1850, high councils
promulgated written rules to govern Mormon communities;
however, they ceased to do so once the legislature began
operating.149 Even the treatment of these rules, however, reveals
ambivalence toward formal legislation. For example, the Salt Lake
High Council promulgated a law dealing with stray livestock that
imposed substantial fines on the owners of the animals. The council
subsequently determined that the rule was too harsh and left the
bishops who applied it with too little discretion. Accordingly, the
council repealed the rule, however, they “also . . . imposed a fine of
25 dollars on any one of the Council who divulged the same as they
wished to let the force of the law do all the good possible after it was
repealed.”150
One Mormon tried to explain the rules applied in church courts
by saying “[t]he laws of the church are revelations. . . . No rule,

145. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO.
21, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870).
146. EDWARD W. TULLIDGE, HISTORY OF SALT LAKE CITY: BIOGRAPHIES 169 (1886).
147. Id. at 169–70.
148. Id. at 170.
149. See, e.g., ORDINANCES PASSED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF GREAT SALT
LAKE CITY, AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED (1849) (showing a collection of ordinances
adopted by the Salt Lake High Council).
150. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 334–35.
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however, is of binding effect until it has been adopted by the people
to whom it applies.”151 In reality, however, appeals to formally
canonized revelations decided few cases. In 1870, a Gentile observed
more accurately that bishop’s courts applied “a sort of wild equity,
that is generally not far from just.”152 Occasionally, to be sure,
church courts looked to biblical rules, for example by requiring fourfold compensation for theft.153 In one case a party appealed to
“known and justly established usages of law and equity in civilized
nations.”154 In some instances church courts followed secular law,155
but they did not hesitate to abandon it, for example by enforcing
debts discharged in bankruptcy156 or by forging a new system of
water rights better suited to the arid Great Basin.157 The upper
reaches of the church’s hierarchy did attempt to create some
uniformity. For example, in some instances Bishops or High
Councils facing a difficult issue wrote the First Presidency, and the
letters sent in reply evidence consistent positions on some points.
The Church’s then official organ, The Deseret News, also printed
articles occasionally, presumably penned by church leaders,
instructing that certain rules be applied in particular situations.
Finally, high church officials regularly traveled from stake to stake,
preaching and instructing local leaders on, among other things, the
proper way of conducting church courts and resolving disputes
among the Latter-day Saints.158 These meetings also provided
151. 3 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 20 (testimony of James E. Talmage).
152. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO.
21, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870).
153. In some cases, Mormon tribunals applied the biblical rules in unusual circumstances.
John Nebeker described one such case decided in 1847 or 1848:
There was one case that created a great deal of fun. A certain man persisted in
keeping a dog. Now a dog would eat pretty much of what, under the circumstances,
could be eaten by the people and therefore all could not afford to keep dogs. This
dog stole some biscuits from a man and the fellow borrowed a shot gun and shot
the dog. The case was brought before me for arbitration, and I gave the man who
had lost the biscuits the full benefit of the law, namely, allowed him four fold—or
16 biscuits, which kept the fellow a whole week.
John Nebeker, Early Justice in Utah, 3 UTAH HIST. Q. 87, 88–89 (1930).
154. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 204.
155. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 339–40.
156. Id. at 342–43.
157. Id. at 321.
158. See, e.g., AN APOSTLE’S RECORD: THE JOURNALS OF ABRAHAM H. CANNON, supra
note 92, at 322 (recording sermons given to stake leaders on conduct of church courts by
Apostle Francis M. Lyman and President George Q. Cannon).
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opportunities to raise questions of substance and procedure with the
visiting leaders.159 Despite these mechanisms, however, the Mormons
never came close to promulgating anything like a religious law code
governing disputes in their courts.
This Mormon ambivalence toward substantive legislation was
linked to Mormon theology. On this point, Mormonism can be
usefully compared with Islam.160 Both religions claim to be
completions of the monotheistic tradition, and both were founded
by prophets who offered the world new sacred texts. Islam, however,
developed an elaborate jurisprudential theory, the usul al-fiqh, which
sought to derive a comprehensive legal code from the Qur’an and
the example (sunna) of the prophet Mohammed.161 There was no
comparable effort in Mormonism to derive detailed substantive rules
from Mormon scripture or its founding prophet. Of course, it took
Islam several centuries to develop a fully elaborated jurisprudence.162
Hence, one might argue that Mormonism is still too young to invite
useful jurisprudential comparison to Islam.
There are deeper differences at work, however, than simply age.
Islam never developed a corporate identity similar to the Christian
idea of a church. Rather, as one scholar has written, “every person, as
such, with no exceptions, was summoned in his own person to obey
the commands of God: there could be no intermediary, no group
responsibility, no evasion of any sort from direct confrontation with
the divine will.”163 Despite this radically individualistic view of
human relation to the divine, however, the notion of a unified

159. See, e.g., sources discussed supra note 90.
160. The comparison was ubiquitous, if universally pejorative, in the nineteenth century.
See generally Arnold H. Green, Mormonism and Islam: From Polemics to Mutual Respect and
Cooperation, BYU STUD., Winter 2001, at 199, 200–09 (discussing the ways in which
Mormonism and Islam were related to one another during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
161. See generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964). For a detailed
account of Islamic legal reasoning, see WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL
THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH (1997).
162. The prophet Mohammed died in 632 A.D. See COULSON, supra note 161, at 22–
23. The usul al-fiqh, however, is dated to a much later period. For example, Ahmad ibn
Hanbal, the founder of the last of the great schools of classical Islamic jurisprudence died in
855 A.D. Id. at 71. See also MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM:
CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN A WORLD CIVILIZATION, THE CLASSICAL AGE OF ISLAM 319
(1974) (providing a brief chronology of the development of the four schools of classical
Islamic jurisprudence—Maliki, Hanifi, Shafi, and Hanbali—between 700 and 855 A.D.).
163. HODGSON, supra note 162, at 318.
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community of the believers (ummah) remained a vital part of Islam.
These seemingly incommensurable aspirations were mediated in part
through the usul al-fiqh, which allowed a professional class of jurists
to impose sufficient consistency to keep Islam’s theological
individualism from undermining the communal cohesion of the
believers.164
Mormonism faced many of these same tensions. Like Islam it
contains a radically individualistic conception of the human
relationship to the divine, albeit on a very different metaphysical
basis. Mormon scripture teaches that the human spirit is uncreated
and co-eternal with God,165 and that every individual is entitled to
direct, personal revelation from God.166 The potentially fragmenting
consequences of such ideas emerged early in Mormon history. In
response to one associate who had begun receiving revelations
directed at the new church, Joseph Smith published a counterrevelation stating “no one shall be appointed to receive
commandments and revelations in this church excepting my servant
Joseph Smith, Jun., for he receiveth them even as Moses.”167 Over
time, Smith created an ever more elaborate ecclesiastical structure—
of which the church courts were a key part—and endowed it with
enormous theological significance, ultimately identifying the church

164. To put the point in Weberian terms, the usul al-fiqh served to control and limit the
charisma of members of the Islamic ummah. See generally HALLAQ, supra note 161, at 21–35
(introducing the usul al-fiqh as it relates to the different communities of Islam).
165. See DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 93:29 (“Man was also in the beginning with God.
Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be.”). See also
TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH, supra note 127, at 352 (“We say that God
himself is a self-existent being. . . . Man does exist upon the same principles.”).
166. In the Bible, the prophet Joel says:
And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit on all flesh; your
sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, and your
young men shall see visions. Even upon the menservants and maidservants in those
days, I will pour out my spirit.
Joel 2:28–29 (RSV). Joseph Smith insisted that the Mormon restoration was to be a fulfillment
of this prophecy. See Joseph Smith—History 1:41, in THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE (Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1981 ed.) (1851). The Pearl of Great Price has been formally
canonized by the Mormon Church, along with the Bible, the Book of Mormon, and the
Doctrine and Covenants. See also DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 1:19–20 (“The weak things of
the world shall come forth and break down the mighty and strong ones . . . that every man
might speak in the name of God the Lord, even the Savior of the world”).
167. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 28:2. See also BUSHMAN, supra note 60, at 120–22
(discussing the confrontation between Joseph Smith and Hiram Page giving rise to this
revelation).
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as a corporate body with the kingdom of God in “the dispensation of
the fullness of times.”168 Thus, in Mormonism the living prophet and
the institutional church performed the function that the usul al-fiqh
performed in Islam, protecting the religious community from the
anarchic forces of its own individualistic theology. As Remi Brague
has put it:
In Islam . . . the development of a more and more precise sharia
that demanded more and more clearly a direct connection to the
origins and become more and more incarnate in a class of jurists
ended up rendering superfluous a caliph who claimed to unite in
his person the political authority of the head of state and the
religious authority of the successor to the Prophet.169

In contrast, Mormons felt no religious need to elaborate a clear body
of substantive law. Indeed, to the extent that such a body of law
would have placed the exegesis of sacred texts in competition with
living prophets, or the church as an institution, it was anathema to
Mormon theology. In contrast, the largely ad hoc approach that
Mormon courts adopted—“a sort of wild equity”170—was both
sufficient to the dispute resolution needs of frontier society and
consonant with their own religious beliefs.
The Mormons struggled to create effective enforcement
mechanisms for their church courts. Previous writers have tended to
assume that, with the exception of the 1846–1850 interlude, the
threat of excommunication was the only method by which the
decisions of church courts could be enforced.171 To be sure, in the
context of closely knit Mormon communities excommunication
carried a heavy cost, including social ostracism and even commercial

168. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 128:20–21. For an excellent discussion of the tension
within Mormon culture between individualistic and corporate or authoritarian elements of
Mormon theology, see TERRYL L. GIVENS, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: A HISTORY OF MORMON
CULTURE 3–19 (2007).
169. REMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 258
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2006).
170. Execution of the Laws in Utah [To accompany bill H.R.No. 1089.], H.R. REP. NO.
215, at 1 (1870) (testimony of Franklin Head, Feb. 28, 1870).
171. See, e.g., FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 287 (“The church court system
relied on the voluntary submission of church members to its decision. While the state courts
enforced decisions with fines, imprisonment, and even death, church courts could only
disfellowship or excommunicate recalcitrant church members.”).
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boycott.172 This, however, is not the whole story. Prior to 1874, the
church courts were only one part of a web of Mormon legal
institutions and practices. Mormons dominated the Territorial
Legislature, and they used their power to limit the authority of
lawyers and the common law they represented. First, the Legislature
very pointedly refused to pass a reception statute making the
common law binding in the territory, instead commanding that “no
laws nor parts of laws shall be read, argued, cited, or adopted in any
court . . . except those enacted by the Governor and Legislative
Assembly.”173 They also abolished technical common-law
pleadings.174 Next, they struck at lawyers by stating that no person
employing an attorney “shall be compelled by any process of law to
pay the counsel so employed.”175 The same law rejected the
adversary system by requiring lawyers to “present all the facts in the
case, whether they are calculated to make against his client or
not.”176
In addition, the legislature created Mormon-dominated courts as
an alternative to the Gentile-dominated Territorial Supreme Court
and district courts. They did this in two ways. First, the
congressional act creating Utah Territory gave to the legislature the
power to create probate courts. Building on a practice common in

172. See, e.g., Richard S. Van Wagoner & Mary C. Van Wagoner, Orson Pratt, Jr.: Gifted
Son of an Apostle and an Apostate, DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1988, at 84, 91
(mentioning the boycott of the business of an apostate Mormon in a remote southern Utah
settlement); Ronald G. Watt, Sailing “The Old Ship Zion”: The Life of George D. Watt, BYU
STUD., Fall 1977, at 48 (“In 1874, however, Watt lost his membership in the Church . . . .
After his excommunication, old friends ignored him and his obscurity began.”).
173. Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah Territory, 1850–61,
DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1988, at 97, 102 (internal quotations omitted).
174. An Act Concerning the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes §10, in ACTS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS PASSED BY THE FIRST ANNUAL AND SPECIAL SESSIONS OF
THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH (1852) [hereinafter 1852 ACTS]
(“Immaterial variancies [sic], errors, or defects, may be disregarded . . . .”). See generally
Homer, supra note 173, at 97 (discussing the history of the common law in nineteenthcentury Utah).
175. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys § 2, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. In
addition, the Territories homestead exemption preserved “the proper tools, instruments, or
books of any farmer, mechanic, surveyor, physician, teacher, or professor.” An Act Concerning
the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes § 22, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. The books of
lawyers and attorneys may have been pointedly omitted.
176. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys § 5, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. A lawyer
failing to comply with this provision was to “be liable to all the penalty hereinbefore provided
for, and the further penalty of not less than one dollar at the discretion of the court.” Id.
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many western territories dissatisfied with carpet-bagging judges, the
legislature gave these probate courts “power to exercise original
jurisdiction both civil and criminal.”177 The probate judges, in turn,
were chosen by the legislature and almost without exception they
were Mormons.178
Second, the legislature adopted a series of laws apparently
designed to make the decisions of church courts legally binding.
They did this by taking an extremely liberal attitude toward
arbitration. “By the consent of the Court and the parties, any person
may be selected to act as Judge for the trial of any particular cause or
question,” stated the territory’s first judiciary act.179 Elsewhere, the
law declared that “[a]ny matter involving litigation may be referred
to arbitrators” chosen by either the parties or the court.180 These
arbitrators had extensive powers. A judge chosen by the parties, said
the law, “shall possess all the powers of the District Judge in the
case.”181 Likewise, arbitrators had the “authority to subpoena
witnesses, administer oaths, or affirmations, and issue process as the
Court.”182 Decisions of arbitrators were to be treated by clerks and
marshals “in the same manner, as if the case had been prosecuted
and decided in the usual manner.”183 Most intriguingly, a special law
177. An Act in Relation to the Judiciary § 30, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174. See EARL S.
POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1861–1890, at 59–60 (1947). See also
Jeffery Ogden Johnson, Was Being a Probate Judge in Pioneer Utah a Church Calling? 1 (May
2006) (unpublished paper presented at the 2006 Meeting of the Mormon History Association
in Casper, Wyo.) (on file with author) (noting that other territories created locally staffed
courts as a way of undermining the control of federally appointed judges).
178. See generally Elizabeth D. Gee, Justice for All or for the “Elect”? The Utah County
Probate Court, 1855–72, 48 UTAH HIST. Q. 129, 136 (1980) (noting that most of the judges
presiding over the probate court also held high church offices); Jay E. Powell, Fairness in the
Salt Lake County Probate Courts, 38 UTAH HIST. Q. 256 (1970) (examining the impartiality of
probate court in Salt Lake during its early years of operation); James B. Allen, The Unusual
Jurisdiction of County Probate Courts in the Territory of Utah, 36 UTAH HIST. Q. 132 (1968)
(exploring the Mormon church’s influence on civil affairs as a result of probate judges being
elected by the legislature); Johnson, supra note 177; Jay Emerson Powell, An Analysis of the
Nature of the Salt Lake County Probate Court’s Role in Aggravating Anti-Mormon
Sentiment, 1852–1855 (June 1968) (Honors Thesis, Department of History, University of
Utah ) (on file with Howard W. Hunter Law Library, Brigham Young University) [hereinafter
Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment] (analyzing the operation of the Salt Lake County Probate
court during those years).
179. An Act in Relation to the Judiciary §11, in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174.
180. Id. § 45.
181. Id. § 11.
182. Id. § 45.
183. Id.
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called for each county to “elect a council of twelve select men as
referees, whose duty it shall be to decide all cases in litigation which
may come before them by the mutual consent of the parties.”184 This
body of men sounds tantalizingly like a local High Council, which
also consisted of twelve men.185 In addition to the number chosen,
the territorial act borrows language from one of Joseph Smith’s
revelations on church courts, declaring that once the Referees make a
decision it “shall be the end of all controversy in the matter.”186 In a
sermon denouncing litigation, Brigham Young explicitly associated
the church courts with this territorial legal structure:
There is not a righteous person, in this community, who will have
difficulties that cannot be settled by arbitrators, the Bishop’s Court,
the High Council, or by the 12 Referees (as provided in Resolution
No. 4, page 390 of Utah Laws), far better and more satisfactory
than to contend with each other in law courts . . . .187

Under territorial law, however, the jurisdiction of such
arbitrators was neither wholly voluntary nor were their decisions
wholly hortatory. Rather, parties could be required by a court to
submit to arbitration,188 arbitrators exercised the procedural powers
of secular judges,189 and their decisions were legally binding.190
Hence, to the extent that church courts acted as the arbitrators
184. Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees, in 1852
ACTS, supra note 174.
185. See Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178, at 28–29 (“There has been
some speculation that the effect of this resolution may have been to give legal status to the
decisions of local high councils, but there is not enough evidence concerning the selection or
actions of these men to permit drawing any conclusions.”).
186. Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees, in 1852
ACTS, supra note 174. Compare DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 107:83 (“And their decision
upon his head shall be an end of controversy concerning him.”).
187. Brigham Young, Lawyers, and Those Who Practice Attending Law Courts, Rebuked—
A Curse Pronounced upon All Who Love Litigation and Do Not Repent, in 3 JOURNAL OF
DISCOURSES 238 (George D. Watts et al. eds., 1856).
188. An Act Concerning the Judiciary, and for Judicial Purposes §11, in 1852 ACTS,
supra note 174.
189. See id. § 11 (a person chosen to decide a case “shall possess all the powers of the
District Judge in the case”); id. § 45 (“[A]rbitrators have authority to subpoena witnesses,
administer oaths, or affirmations, and issue process as the Court.”).
190. See id. § 45 (“And when they shall have made their decision, shall report the
case . . . to the Clerk of the County in which the case has arisen . . . and it shall be the duty of
the Clerk . . . [to] proceed in the same manner, as if the case had been prosecuted and decided
in the usual manner.”); Resolution in Relation to Election of Twelve Select Men, or Referees,
in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174.
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under any of these laws, they exercised in theory a power
substantially identical to that held by secular trial judges.
It is not at all clear, however, that this legal machinery ever
functioned as intended. There are no reported cases invoking the
provisions governing arbitration. Furthermore, ultimate control of
the territorial judiciary lay in the hands of Gentile appointees who
were often actively hostile to the Territorial Legislature. One of the
earliest of these judges declared “that the Utah laws are founded in
ignorance” and could thus be ignored,191 insisting in one case that
“[t]he law must be construed by men learned in the Law, and not by
virtue of any Priesthood.”192 A later court declared that the
Mormons had “tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles of the
Common Law suited to their conditions,” despite the explicit earlier
territorial legislation to the contrary, which the court ignored.193
Finally, in 1874, Congress passed an act abolishing the extensive
jurisdiction of the probate courts as part of an effort to facilitate
polygamy prosecutions by increasing Gentile control of the territorial
judiciary.194 In short, the courts disregarded the statutes passed by
the Territorial Legislature, which were also met with congressional
hostility.
It is difficult to gauge how successful the Mormons ultimately
were at suppressing intra-Mormon litigation. In his annual message
to the Legislature in 1850, then-Governor Young reported proudly
that not a single lawsuit had been heard before the district courts of
the territory.195 The diary of Hosea Stout, a Mormon attorney active

191. Letter from Samuel W. Richards, member of the Utah Legislature, to his brother
(Dec. 7, 1855), in EDWARD W. TULLIDGE, HISTORY OF SALT LAKE CITY 145 (1886).
192. People v. Green, 1 Utah 11, 15 (1876).
193. First Nat’l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 107 (1873) (holding that the Statute of
Frauds had been tacitly accepted in Utah). Ironically, while the Territorial Supreme Court
essentially ignored early territorial enactments attempting to exclude the common law, those
territorial statutes have been invoked more recently by the Utah Supreme Court as aids in
interpreting the Utah State Constitution. See Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg.
Co., 1999 UT 18, ¶¶ 13132, 974 P.2d 1194 (citing territorial statutes).
194. See Poland Act, Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874). At about the
same time, a case reached the Utah Territorial Supreme Court on the jurisdiction of the Utah
probate courts. The justices ruled that the Territorial Legislature had exceeded its power under
Utah’s Organic Act by endowing the probate courts with unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Cast v. Cast, 1 Utah 112, 119–20 (1873).
195. Homer, supra note 173, at 98.
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in this period, however, records numerous lawsuits.196 Unfortunately,
virtually all of the records of civil cases by the Utah Territorial
Courts were either lost or destroyed. Hence it is difficult to compile
an accurate picture of civil litigation in Mormon country during the
nineteenth century. Records of the Mormon-dominated probate
courts do exist, and detailed studies of two of the most important of
these courts reveal an ambiguous picture.197 Analysis of the Utah
County Probate Court shows that Gentiles were much more likely to
institute civil litigation than were Mormons. Seventy-three percent of
the plaintiffs were Gentiles, who never constituted more than
seventeen percent of the population prior to 1874 when the
jurisdiction of the probate courts was sharply limited.198 On the
other hand, of civil cases litigated to judgment, more than half
involved Mormons suing other Mormons.199 A study of the Salt Lake
County Probate Court between 1852 and 1855 revealed that intraMormon litigation constituted thirty percent of all litigation
involving Mormons.200 It is possible, of course, that this intraMormon litigation only occurred after trying to unsuccessfully
resolve the case in a church court, which would be in line with
ecclesiastical procedure.201 A more likely interpretation, however, is

196. See 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 363 (entry for Mar. 5,
1850: “Instituted a suit against Robt Porter & Peter Lish for tresspassing [sic] on the property
of Lewis Vasques”); id. at 364 (entry for Mar. 9. 1850: “. . . I also prosecuted another Suit H.
S. Eldrege V.S Mr Long for killing an ox which did not belong to him”); Id. at 367 (entry for
Apr. 22, 1850: “Attended a trial Dan Jones Vs E. Williams in matter of debt as council for
Jones”); Id. at 370 (entry for May 30, 1850: “Attending to Legal business Sally Murdoc V.S.
S. O Holmes in matter of debt”); id. at 378 (entry for Aug. 21, 1850: “Still engaged in Legal
business Bullar vs Tolton in debt on part of Tolton”).
197. See generally Gee, supra note 178 (examining the records of the Utah County
Probate Court); Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178 (examining the records of
the Salt Lake County Probate Court).
198. Gee, supra note 178, at 139.
199. See id. at 144 (showing that for the period studied, twenty-one cases involving
Mormon plaintiffs and Mormon defendants were litigated to judgment, while only nineteen
other civil cases received a final judgment on the merits).
200. See Powell, Anti-Mormon Sentiment, supra note 178, at 74 (showing twenty-five
resident vs. resident cases out of a total of eighty-three cases involving residents); id. at 48
(“While residency and membership in the Mormon Church can be generally equated during
this period, there were undoubtedly a few non-member residents. What the Utah emigration
list yields is specifically Mormon emigration; so technically what we have is a Mormon/nonMormon split.”).
201. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, surpa note 17, at 267–71 (discussing procedures that
allowed intra-Mormon litigation).
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that while the church judiciary limited litigation among Latter-day
Saints, it never came close to eliminating it.
In part, the Mormon attempt to opt out of civil litigation
reflected dissatisfaction with the expense and contentiousness of
common-law adjudication. For example, church president Wilford
Woodruff wrote to one stake president in 1896 that
“[h]eartburnings, bitterness, and ill-feeling invariably attend lawsuits,
whichever way they terminate, and we are desirous to stop litigation
among the members of the church.”202 Likewise, one prolific critic of
Brigham Young and Mormonism nevertheless insisted that “[t]he
judicial department of the priesthood . . . has saved the brethren and
sisters all the trouble and expense of lawsuits when differences have
arisen among them.”203 Another key concern was communal unity.
The strenuous efforts of nineteenth-century Mormons were directed
toward “the building up of Zion,” a vision of the godly society that
was to be achieved by the Latter-day Saints in the here and now of
Jacksonian Missouri and later the expanses of the Great Basin.204
Central to the idea of Zion was the need for harmony and unity.
“[I]f ye are not one,” God declares in the text of one of Joseph
Smith’s revelations, “ye are not mine.”205 The “heartburnings” of
litigation were a threat to this unity, and the expansive jurisdiction of
church courts sought—with uneven success to be sure—to maintain
the communal harmony central to this vision of Zion. They also
served to heighten the divide, so important for nineteenth-century

202. Quoted in 2 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 17.
203. STENHOUSE, supra note 92, at 564. Likewise, J.H. Beadle, the editor of THE
CORRINE REPORTER and an activist in anti-Mormon politics, testified before Congress:
Well, I will do our bishop—we call him “our bishop” in accordance with the
universal custom—the credit to say that, where no special interests of his religion are
involved, he generally does substantial justice. He knows nothing of law; but in
ordinary cases, when not instructed by the “council,” he will use his best judgment,
and generally do nearly right.
Laws in Utah, Additional Testimony, H.R. 21 at 10–11, Serial Set Vol. No. 1436, Session Vol.
No. 1, 41st Cong. (2d Sess. 1870) (testimony of J.H. Beadle, Feb. 11, 1874). Note, from
Beadle’s testimony it is difficult to tell if he is referring to the local bishop’s court or the local
probate court of which the bishop was a judge.
204. See generally ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM, supra note 84 (discussing the
concept of Zion and its relationship to the communitarianism of Mormon economic
experiments). See also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FERAMORZ Y. FOX & DEAN L. MAY,
BUILDING THE CITY OF GOD: COMMUNITY & COOPERATION AMONG THE MORMONS (2d ed.
1992) (same).
205. DOCTRINE & COVENANTS § 38:27.
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Mormons, between the Saints and “the World.” The secular courts
represented the Babylon out of which the Latter-day Saints had been
gathered, while the church courts were identified with the Zion to
which they had fled.
The Mormon objection to “suing before the ungodly,” however,
was also tied up with the spectacle of litigation. “Court day” was an
important civic ritual in nineteenth-century America. Few towns had
permanent magistrates above the level of justices of the peace, and
more complicated cases were handled by circuit courts that met—
usually twice a year—at county seats. These gatherings were major
social, economic, and political events. During the colonial period,
they served to enact social hierarchies, with genteel magistrates
decked out in the regalia of royal authority.206 In Massachusetts, for
example, traveling justices were met at the county line by the sheriff,
who would accompany them to the court house, where “[t]rumpets
and drums or firearm volleys announced the justices’ arrival in
town.”207 After independence, court day continued to enact social
hierarchies,208 but it also developed into a rollicking democratic
carnival.209 Court sessions were accompanied by peddlers on the
courthouse square hawking their wares, which generally included a
generous amount of alcohol. Drunken fights were common. Indeed,

206. See, e.g., RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA: 1740–1790, at 88–94
(1982) (discussing court day in colonial Virginia); A.G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom:
The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater, Virginia, 1720 to 1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 29 (1980)
(same).
207. MARTHA J. MCNAMARA, FROM TAVERN TO COURTHOUSE: ARCHITECTURE &
RITUAL IN AMERICAN LAW, 1658–1860, at 12 (2004).
208. See, e.g., Ariela Julie Gross, Pandora’s Box: Slavery, Character, and Southern Culture
in the Courtroom, 1800–1860, at 205–17 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University) (on file with author) (discussing the role of the planter elite in court-day rituals in
Nachez, Mississippi during the 1830s).
209. See, e.g., Life in the Backwoods: Scraps from the Note-Book of a Missouri Lawyer,
SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: A CHRONICLE OF THE TURF, AGRICULTURE, FIELD SPORTS,
LITERATURE AND THE STAGE, Sept. 19, 1846, at 355, 356 (“A session of the Circuit Court
not only draws together the parties litigant, their witnesses and friends, but a host of others,
who attend out of curiosity, or for a frolic, or to trade horses, or to make up a scrub race, or to
make a promised settlement; for ‘Court week’ is the time generally designated for a settlement
of accounts.”); Sketches of Life in Missouri, SPIRIT OF THE TIMES: A CHRONICLE OF THE TURF,
AGRICULTURE, FIELD SPORTS, LITERATURE AND THE STAGE, Feb. 29, 1840, at 614 (“The
Circuit Court for the district had that day commenced its sittings, and the town, a neat little
germ of a hamlet, was thronged with suitors, witnesses, lawyers, and the farmers from the
surrounding country . . . . [T]he busy ‘hum of preparation’ could be heard in every quarter of
the town.”).
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they were part of the appeal of court day, as one diarist complained
in 1807 “a very Poor Court, no fighting or Gouging, very few
Drunken people.”210 One veteran lawyer described Illinois court days
in the 1840s and 1850s, noting that “the local belles came in to see
and be seen” and the work continued in the court house “from
‘early morn till dewy eve’” while ribaldry in the tavern continued
“from dewy eve to early morn.”211 George C. Cooke’s 1834 painting
Patrick Henry Arguing the Parson’s Case in the Hanover County
Courthouse anachronistically provides an image of the kind of
communal drama associated with a nineteenth-century court day.212
The lawyer stands in a small but packed courtroom. The spectators,
who are intently focused on his oratory, crowd around a rough-hued
bench where the lawyers sit. They spill out the open door into the
square beyond. In the foreground a pair of children play in the
courtroom with a hoop and stick, while in the background we see
the sign for a tavern that waits to refresh the crowd of thirsty
spectators. Indeed, there was a symbiotic relationship between
courthouses and taverns. Many frontier courts sat in the public
rooms of taverns in the absence of courthouses.213 Likewise, in some
cases taverns were purposefully established close to courthouses to
service the people who gathered to watch the judges and lawyers.214
In short,
[c]ourtroom trials . . . provided prime entertainment for the
community. [C]ourtrooms were always crowded because the
drama, tragedy, and comedy of real life occurred there. With judges
and lawyers as the star actors, the courtroom substituted for
theater, concert halls, and the opera. Spectators in the courtroom

210. LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 8. See also DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 105–
06 (1995) (discussing court day in antebellum Illinois and noting the abundance of whiskey,
gambling, and fighting).
211. HENRY C. WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 42 (Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1892).
212. The original is housed in the Virginia Historical Society. Most of the detail in the
painting is anachronistic and “more in keeping with early nineteenth-century designs on the
frontier.” LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 152.
213. See MCNAMARA, supra note 207, at 12.
214. See LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing courthouses “and important private
buildings, especially the taverns, that grew up around them”).
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expected a good show from the lawyers, the judges, the witnesses
and the other participants.215

It was precisely this theatrical aspect of litigation, however, that
concerned the Mormons.
On February 24, 1856, Brigham Young delivered a blistering
sermon against lawyers and law courts.216 He began his denunciation
by describing the performance of a lawyer that he had observed the
day before. “[H]e was so serious, so religious, so pious, and so
honest, that he appealed to high heaven to witness his honesty
before the jury,” said Young, but “[w]hen he had induced the jury
to believe that he was honest, he stood there and misrepresented the
merits of the case, for half an hour at a stretch, in regular lawyer
style.”217 Such conduct, he insisted, was particularly objectionable
when done by Mormon lawyers at the instigation of Mormon clients.
“Does the Lord love your conduct when you drag each other before
the ungodly? . . . Do you think He has fellowship with your conduct
in such things? No, you do not.”218 However, while Young’s remarks
were “severe upon the lawyers”219 (and their clients), he spent the
bulk of the sermon castigating the spectators at the trial.
It is a shame for men to be found loafing about in such places,
where there is contention, and quarrelling, and every stratagem
that can be used to deceive juries and witnesses, and lying before
them with all the grace and sanctity of a Saint, pretending to be

215. John A. Lupton, A. Lincoln, Esquire: The Evolution of a Lawyer, in A. LINCOLN,
ESQUIRE: A SHREWD, SOPHISTICATED LAWYER IN HIS TIME 18, 18–19 (Allen D. Spiegel ed.,
2002).
216. Young’s remarks came as the confrontation between local Mormons and Gentile
federal appointees over control of the Territorial government heated up prior to President
Buchanan’s decision to launch the so-called “Utah War.” See Dale D. Goble, Theocracy vs.
Diversity: Local vs. National in Territorial Utah, in LAW IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES
293, 296 (Gordon Morris Bakken ed., 2000) (noting that in the wake of Young’s remarks
“[m]obs sacked the offices of non-Mormon lawyers; federally appointed judges were
threatened”). While Goble is correct to locate Young’s remarks in the context of pre-Utah War
tensions, the mob attack he refers to actually took place some ten months later in December
1856, after Justice George P. Stiles, an apostate Mormon appointed to the Territorial bench,
sought to displace the Mormon Territorial Marshall with the non-Mormon U.S. Marshall, thus
eroding Mormon influence on the judiciary. See NORMAN F. FURNISS, THE MORMON
CONFLICT, 1850–1859 at 57–58 (1960) (discussing the confrontation between the Mormons
and Justice Stiles).
217. Young, supra note 187, at 237.
218. Id. at 238–39.
219. Id.

196

OMAN.PP3

157]

2/13/2009 6:00 PM

Preaching to the Court House and Judging in the Temple

one. Such a place is darker to me than midnight darkness.220

In part, he was appalled at the idleness of the spectators. Such
men, he said, ought to be “raising grain, potatoes, and other articles
of food, instead of following after courts and the nonsense,
wickedness, and lying associated with them.”221 It was not simply the
waste of time, however, that attracted Young’s wrath. Rather, he
thought that the spectacle itself was degrading. “Elders of Israel . . .
throng to such a place, and that too when no spirit reigns there but
the devil’s spirit . . . . [Y]ou can get nothing from that den but the
principles of hell.”222 Even more colorfully, he called the show of
litigation “[t]he fog, the froth, and spawn of hell, and they [that is,
the spectators] feast upon it.”223
Young’s attack on litigation is reminiscent of puritanical sermons
against the theater over the centuries.224 While Young himself was
not opposed to drama,225 his attack on litigation shares with the
religious denunciation of theaters a basic concern for the moral
consequences of watching sin and wickedness as entertainment. In
Young’s view, litigation was a battle of wits between amoral lawyers,
an exciting spectacle but ultimately a degrading one. It was not
simply the contentiousness of litigation or the dishonesty of the
lawyers themselves that was objectionable. It was the moral impact
on the community of placing such a spectacle at the center of civic
life. Seen in these terms, the move to bring litigation within the
church was a move to transform the public meaning of dispute
resolution.
To be sure, prior to the arrival of the first Gentile appointees to
the Utah Territorial bench, the Mormons had their own muted
version of court day. In 1852, shortly after the Territory of Utah was
organized, Zerubabbel Snow, a Mormon attorney who had been

220. Id. at 238.
221. Id. at 239.
222. Id. at 238.
223. Id. at 239.
224. See GIVENS, supra note 168, at 143–45 (discussing religious denunciations of the
theater).
225. See id. at 145–49 (discussing Young’s support for the theater in pioneer Utah);
Richard Cracroft, “Cows to Milk Instead of Novels to Read”: Brigham Young, Novel Reading,
and Kingdom Building, BYU STUD., Summer 2001, at 102, 112–13 (“It is pleasing and
instructing to see certain characters personified upon the boards of a theatre . . . [that] is
managed upon righteous principles.” (quoting Brigham Young)).
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appointed Chief Justice of the new Territorial Supreme Court, rode
circuit through the far-flung settlements inaugurating the first
district courts. However, he did not enter town as the head of a
judicial entourage with lawyers in tow. Rather, he came as a small
part of a much larger party led by Brigham Young, who spoke to the
citizens as Territorial Governor and—far more importantly from
their point of view—preached to them as living prophet and leader
of their church.226 In this theo-political pageant Justice Snow was a
decidedly small player.227
In place of the secular ritual of court day, the church courts
offered their own set of public symbols. In at least some cases,
adjudication was open to the public, and local newspapers sometimes
even announced church trials in advance.228 For example, during the
1850s, the Salt Lake High Council heard cases each Saturday in the
Salt Lake Social Hall before large groups of spectators who were
occasionally called upon to participate in the proceedings. Men in
the audience might be asked to replace a high councilor who was
absent or who recused himself from a particular case.229 Likewise, in
one 1859 case the minutes record, “The Persons present in the room
were called upon and also unanimously sustained the decision about
fifty persons present besides the authorities and council.”230 While
parties occasionally retained attorneys to represent them before a
high council—particularly when resort to the church court was one
move in protracted litigation spanning both secular and ecclesiastical
tribunals—generally speaking lawyers were excluded from the

226. See Journal of William Clayton (May 12, 1852), in AN INTIMATE CHRONICLE: THE
JOURNALS OF WILLIAM CLAYTON 411–12 (George D. Smith ed., 1995) (recounting Justice
Snow’s inaugurating circuit court sittings while touring the territory with Brigham Young). See
also LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, BRIGHAM YOUNG: AMERICAN MOSES 306–10 (2d ed. 1991)
(discussing Brigham Young’s tours through Utah Territory as Governor).
227. See DONALD, supra note 210, at 104–05 (describing a caravan of circuit-riding
lawyers with the judge at their head).
228. Salt Lake High Council minutes report that in early cases when members were
absent, “[t]he vacancies were filled from bystanders.” See, e.g., THE OLD FORT, supra note
143, at 76, 79. See, e.g., Bountiful Briefs, DAVIS COUNTY CLIPPER, Jan. 27, 1899, at 1 (“The
Bishop’s court is trying the Smedley-Goodfellow case this week.”).
229. See THE OLD FORT, supra note 143, at 76, 79.
230. Ecclesiastical Court Cases Collection, Disfellowshipment Records, 1839–1965, CR
355, 2, 1858, n.2, Church Archives, The Family and Church History Department, The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah (transcript in author’s
possession).
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proceedings.231 In accordance with rules laid down by Joseph Smith,
however, an equal number of high councilors were assigned to speak
on either side of a case when the council deliberated.232 The rule was
less of a surrogate for representation than a device to ensure the
appearance (and hopefully the reality) of even-handed deliberation.
Likewise, the absence of technical rules of evidence was supposed to
ensure that church courts could reach the truth of the matter.233 In
contrast, said Young, “juries are liable to be deceived.”234 Perhaps
most dramatically, decisions by church courts frequently required
erring parties to publicly confess their sins before their congregations
and quarrelling members were often required to engage in acts of
public reconciliation.235 In short, ecclesiastical courts transformed
adjudication from a spectacle of amoral attorneys engaged in a battle
of wits into an essentially Christian drama of sin, confession,
reconciliation, and public redemption, a fact not lost on
contemporary observers. For example, one diarist recorded the
deliberations in an 1843 case using the language of Christian
atonement, noting “Hyrum plead for mercy, Joseph for Justice,
[and] the Twelve decided according to testimony . . . .”236 The goal,

231. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 366 (noting that Hosea Stout,
an early Utah attorney, served as counsel to a victorious party in a suit before a bishop’s court).
232. See Kirtland High Council Minutes, supra note 99. See also DOCTRINE &
COVENANTS § 102:1–3, 5–6, 8–16, 22–30.
233. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 283 (discussing the treatment of
evidence in Mormon courts).
234. Young, supra note 187, at 239.
235. See, e.g., FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 9 (“Confession of br. Ziba Peterson
of his transgression which was satisfactory to the Church as approved by unanimous vote.”).
236. Diary of Wilford Woodruff (May 27, 1843), in WAITING FOR WORLD’S END: THE
DIARIES OF WILFORD WOODRUFF 58–59 (Susan Staker, ed., 1993). Woodruff’s language here
tracks Mormon scripture’s understanding of Jesus Christ’s death as a reconciliation of both
divine justice of sin and divine mercy toward the sinner:
[T]hat great and last sacrifice will be the Son of God, yea, infinite and eternal.
And thus he shall bring salvation to all those who shall believe on his name; this
being the intent of this last sacrifice, to bring about the bowels of mercy, which
overpowereth justice, and bringeth about means unto men that they may have faith
unto repentance. And thus mercy can satisfy the demands of justice, and encircles
them in the arms of safety, while he that exercises no faith unto repentance is
exposed to the whole law of the demands of justice . . . .
Alma 34:14–16 in THE BOOK OF MORMON (The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
1981) (1830).
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as the minutes of one early meeting put it, was for “[a]ll differences
[to be] settled [and] hearts of all [to be] run together in love.”237
In nineteenth-century Mormon culture, the displacing of the
civic spectacle of litigation with religious spectacle shows up in other
ways. In many county seats in nineteenth-century America, the
central public building around which the community was physically
organized was the court house.238 The physical location of the
building reinforced the ritual primacy of adjudication of civic life.
Indeed, in some towns the courthouse was the only public building,
and religious services were held there.239 In contrast, when the
Mormons laid out their settlements in the Great Basin, they sought
to impose a very different symbolic order on their civic landscape.240
The central public building was not the courthouse, but rather the
stake “tabernacle.” All roads in a town, for example, were numbered
in relation to this religious building, which served as both meeting
hall and administrative headquarters for the stake presidency and
High Council.241 The link to religious adjudication was not left
implicit. For example, when the Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, in
many ways the symbolic template for literally hundreds of Mormon
villages, was dedicated in 1875, the prayer pled:
Bless the High Council of this and other stakes of Zion, may they
be full of the spirit of wisdom, justice and judgment, and, under
the inspiration of the Most High, be quick to discern the right,

237. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 45.
238. For example, one author described the villages of ante-bellum Illinois from which
the Mormons emigrated in 1846: “The settlement almost invariably clustered around a public
square of generous dimensions, in the center of which stood the court-house, a substantial
building of brick or stone.” FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 171 (1906).
239. See LOUNSBURY, supra note 1, at 317 (“Because many of these rural communities
were devoid of a public place of worship, citizens gathered in the courthouse for divine
services.”) John Phillip Reid, The Layers of Western Legal History, in LAW IN THE WESTERN
UNITED STATES 7 (Gordon Morris Bakken ed., 2000) (“As Americans moved westward down
the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers, and from the Georgia backcountry across the Mississippi,
many of their important centers for commercial, social, and economic life grew up around
courthouses. The courthouse square was often the center of town or county, stores and trade
shops located about it, and often the better residences were in the vicinity.”).
240. See generally C. MARK HAMILTON, NINETEENTH-CENTURY MORMON
ARCHITECTURE AND CITY PLANNING (1995) (discussing Mormon town planning and
architecture in the nineteenth century); Martha Sonntag Bradley, Creating the Sacred Space of
Zion, J. MORMON HIST., 1 (Summer 2005) (same); Richard H. Jackson, Sacred Space and City
Planning: The Mormon Example, 9 ARCHITECTURE & BEHAV. 251 (1993) (same).
241. See HAMILTON, supra note 240, at 53–75 (discussing the role of tabernacles in
Mormon towns in the nineteenth century).
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wise to admonish the wrong doer, free from all bias; and with
integrity, truth, lowliness, patience, and fidelity, administer
impartial justice to all.242

Moreover, while some attacked the actual outcomes in church
court cases,243 criticism of the system tended to emphasize the
symbolic affront of displacing the secular law rather than the actual
workings of the Mormon judiciary. For example, in April, 1838,
Seymour Brunson filed a complaint against Oliver Cowdery, one of
Joseph Smith’s closest early associates and a leading elder of the
Church, charging him with a long list of spiritual and civil lapses,
including “dishonestly [r]etaining notes after they had been paid.”244
Cowdery responded with a lengthy letter to the High Council in
which he denied their jurisdiction, invoking secular myths of noble
Anglo-Saxon legality and the symbolic power of the constitution.
“My venerable ancestor was among that little band, who landed on
the rocks of Plymouth in 1620,” he wrote.245 “[W]ith him he
brought those maxims, and a body of those laws which were the
result and experience of many centuries, on the basis of which now
stands our great and happy Government.”246 He went on, “This
attempt to control me in my temporal interests, I conceive to be a
disposition to take from me a portion of my Constitutional privileges
and inherent rights.”247 A short time later Lyman Johnson, another
high-ranking elder, refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the High
Council in a case involving a civil lawsuit, responding with similar
imagery. “I should not condescend,” he wrote, “to put my
constitutional rights at issue upon so disrespectful a point.”248 The
rhetoric testifies to the way that the Mormon courts displaced the

242. John Taylor, Dedicatory Prayer for the Salt Lake Tabernacle (October 9, 1875), in
JOURNAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH, Church Archives, The Family and Church History
Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City Utah.
243. For example, the Salt Lake Tribune claimed that church courts were a means by
which a church member could “use his power in the church to oppress and rob a brother
member.” Church Robbery, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 1, 1891, at 4. More sinisterly, it insisted
that even when the church excommunicated a member for serious misconduct (in this case
incest) “the secret priestly court, as they always do, kept the crime a secret.” A Sorry Defense,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 1890, at 4.
244. FAR WEST RECORD, supra note 67, at 163.
245. Id. at 165.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 173.
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secular symbols and rituals of litigation with a distinctively religious
set of symbols and rituals.
III. “LAWYERS OF THEIR OWN” AND THE DECLINE OF THE
MORMON COURTS
After seventy years or more of practice, the Mormons ultimately
abandoned the resolution of civil disputes in ecclesiastical courts,
reserving church tribunals for more traditional questions of church
discipline. The end of the expansive jurisdiction of the church courts
was a ragged affair that involved both an official retreat from certain
classes of disputes by church leaders and a gradual abandonment of
the church courts by rank-and-file members. Ultimately, a variety of
causes account for the shift. First, Mormon attitudes toward lawyers
and litigation changed as a result of both attempts by Mormon
lawyers to craft legitimating religious narratives for their work and
dramatic changes in the nature of the legal profession itself. Second,
as Mormon country integrated into the national economy in the late
nineteenth-century, ecclesiastical courts increasingly faced disputes
that they had neither the technical expertise nor the remedial
machinery to handle effectively. Both of these causes, in turn, were
part of the accommodation of Mormonism to American culture at
the end of the nineteenth-century. This process involved the
abandonment of distinctive Mormon practices—most notably
polygamy—and an implicit agreement that Mormonism would
henceforth conduct itself more in the manner of a Protestant sect
rather than a theocratic kingdom.249 Previous historians have noted
that Mormonism was forced to accommodate itself to a Protestant
view of the constitution.250 The end of the civil jurisdiction of church
courts marked a similar accommodation to a late nineteenth-century
Protestantism that insisted on the separation of the private law from
religious and (non-Anglo-Saxon) ethic allegiances. In short, part of
becoming fully American meant fully embracing the secular common
law.
249. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER, MORMONISM IN TRANSITION: A HISTORY OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1890–1930 (1996) (discussing the accommodation of Mormonism
to norms of Protestant American society at the turn of the twentieth-century).
250. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 22, at 82 (“Reformers [hostile to Mormon
polygamy] were committed to the release of fetters of human progress, to the onward march of
civilization through the purification of marriage to protect and promote freedom, democracy,
and equality—all in a constitutional system that integrated Christianity and political liberty.”).

THE
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From the beginning, Mormon attorneys sought to create an
ecclesiastical identity for themselves other than that of lying tricksters
bent on stirring up litigation. For example, in 1850 one Mormon
lawyer noted in his diary that his client’s case was resolved by an
“Elders meeting,” a method that he praised for “sav[ing] the time,
expense & hard feelings of a long and tedious lawsuit” and which he
commended to the assembled people.251 Brigham Young eventually
came to adopt this self-conception of Mormon attorneys as working
in the spirit of the church courts. Despite his hell-fire and damnation
sermons against lawyers in the 1850s, his opposition to attorneys was
never absolute. As early as 1852, for example, he said, after
acknowledging the law as an educational pursuit, “[w]e want every
branch of science taught in this place that is taught in the world.”252
An 1872 sermon shows a further softening. While insisting that he
did not “want any lawyers in our society,” he went on to say:
There are many lawyers who are very excellent men. What is the
advice of an honorable gentleman in the profession of the law? “Do
not go to law with your neighbor. . . .” Why not . . . say we will
arbitrate this case, and we will have no lawsuit, and no difficulty
with our neighbor, to alienate our feelings one with another? This
is the way we should do as a community.253

From the amoral tricksters of his earlier sermons, Young’s
thinking developed to a point in which he envisioned wise and
learned men who acted in the spirit of church-based reconciliation
rather than court-based litigation.
Young’s rapprochement with the legal profession went beyond
mere rhetoric. In 1868, Young spoke with Franklin S. Richards, the
son of a close associate, about Richards’ future plans. Richards
replied that he was studying medicine. Young insisted that it would
251. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 370. The diary records:
“President Young recommended this method & for brethren to try their difficulties first in the
church and not go to law untill [sic] a man will not abide the decisions of the church tribunals.
I also made a short address recommending the same measures.” Id.
252. Brigham Young, The Lord at the Head of His Kingdom—Self-Discipline—
Necessity of Cultivating a Knowledge of Science, and Particularly of Theology, Etc. (sermon
delivered April 7, 1852), in 6 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 314, 317 (George D. Watts et al. eds.,
1856). It is possible that he was referring to a “Law School” established five months earlier by
Mormon attorneys in Salt Lake City. See text accompanying infra notes 271–272.
253. Brigham Young, Discourse by President Brigham Young, Delivered at the 42nd
Semi-Annual Conference, Salt Lake City (October 9, 1872), in 15 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES
220, 224–25 (George D. Watts et al. eds., 1856).
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be better if Richards were to take up the study of law, “because the
time will come when the Latter-day Saints will need lawyers of their
own to defend them in the Courts and strive with fearless inspiration
to maintain their constitutional rights.”254 Richards went on to
become an attorney, eventually serving as general counsel to the
church. An 1883 sketch of Richards presented him as the incarnation
of Young’s later vision of learned lawyers embedded within the
context of church courts. “As a churchman and High Councilor
[Richards’] advice has uniformly been to litigants to settle their
difficulties themselves or by arbitration, in the modes prescribed by
Church discipline; that only such cases should go to the courts as
could not be adjusted by these methods.”255
As the nineteenth-century progressed, Mormons continued to
treat the legal profession with suspicion, but they simultaneously
sought to sanctify it by embedding Mormon lawyers in the narratives
of priesthood authority and revelation that stood at the core of the
church judiciary. Hence, one Latter-day Saint attorney recorded that
in the early 1880s he and his law partner were rebuked from the
pulpit by their local bishop for having “blossomed out as full-fledged
lawyers.”256 At about the same time, the stake president of another
young man who was considering law school told him, “You will go
to Hell!” and urged him to consult with Brigham Young’s successor
as president of the church, John Taylor.257 The young man met with
Taylor, who attempted to dissuade him. When he was unconvinced,
Taylor laid hands on his head and gave him a blessing that cautiously
sanctified his legal education. “Brother Moyle, in the name of the
Lord Jesus Christ, and by the virtue of the Holy Priesthood, we lay
our hands upon thy head to seal upon thee a blessing,” Taylor
began.258 He continued, “we say unto thee that [law] is a dangerous
profession, one that leads many people down to destruction.”259 The

254. Ken Driggs, “Lawyers of Their Own to Defend Them”: The Legal Career of Franklin
Snyder Richards, J. MORMON HIST. 84, 88 (Fall 1995).
255. Edward W. Tullidge, Franklin S. Richards, 2 TULLIDGE’S Q. MAG. 456, 466
(1883).
256. John R. Alley, Jr., Utah State Supreme Court Justice Samuel R. Thurman, 61 UTAH
H. Q. 233, 237 (1993).
257. MORMON DEMOCRAT: THE RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF JAMES
HENRY MOYLE 108–09 (Gene A. Sessions ed., 1998) [hereinafter MORMON DEMOCRAT].
258. Id. at 109–10.
259. Id. at 110.
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blessing, however, went on to affirm the young man’s choice. “[I]f
thou wilt abstain from arguing falsely and on false principles
maintaining only the things that can be honorably sustained by
honorable men . . . the Lord God will bless thee in this calling . . .
with wisdom and intelligence, and with the light of revelation.”260
Using language normally reserved for men chosen as missionaries or
for other church positions, the blessing concluded, “We set thee
apart . . . to go forth as thou hast desired to study and become
acquainted with all the principles of law and equity.”261 The trend
continued when a decade later, Taylor’s successor, Wilford
Woodruff, issued a “call” to one young school teacher to travel east
to Cornell to study law.262 In doing so, he fused the study of law
with the mechanism—a call from the prophet—through which
earlier generations of Mormons had been sent forth to proclaim
Joseph Smith’s message of restoration or to found distant
settlements as part of establishing Zion in the Great Basin.
Changing Mormon attitudes toward lawyers, not surprisingly,
mirrored changes within the legal profession itself. Developments
that occurred early in the metropolitan centers of the East often
happened much later on the frontier inhabited by the Latter-day
Saints. In the 1750s, incensed at “Pettyfoggers,” John Adams
recommended that Suffolk County create a bar association.263 His
complaints with what he regarded as the dishonest antics of lawyers
bent on deceiving juries and taking advantage of clients might have
been penned by Brigham Young a century later. Adams and his
associates, however, responded to the failings that they perceived in
the legal profession very differently. Their solution was to exclude
irregular practitioners from the courts and increase the level of
training required to become a licensed attorney,264 a process of

260. Id.
261. Id. at 110–11.
262. Justin David Call: Biographical Notes (unpublished manuscript in the author’s
possession) (“Father was called to be a missionary to New York and to study law at Cornell
University. The call received was from the First Presidency of the L.D.S. Church and signed by
President Wilford Woodruff, George Q. Cannon and Joseph F. Smith—Sept. 16, 1895.”).
263. See GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS 1760–1840, at 13 (1979).
264. Id. at 131.
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professionalization largely complete in Massachusetts by the third or
fourth decade of the nineteenth century.265
On the frontier, however, the professional standards were much
laxer. In contrast to the increasingly well-educated professionals in
the East, “[w]estern lawyers, as a rule, were the sons of poor or
middle-class people and seldom had a college education.”266 Indeed,
there was even a process of formal de-professionalization on the
frontier. Prior to 1830, most state and territorial statutes required an
apprenticeship of two to three years before a man could be admitted
to the bar. A widespread movement abolished such requirements
during the Jacksonian period, however, and the tendency on the
frontier was “to allow a young man to practice law as soon as he
could convince any judge that he knew ‘some law.’”267
Initially, Utah Territory adopted this relaxed attitude toward the
profession. An 1852 “Act for the Regulation of Attorneys” stated
that “it shall be the duty of all Judges of courts in this Territory, to
grant a hearing as counsel to any person of good moral character,
chosen by any person or persons to prosecute or defend a case.”268
Many otherwise untrained advocates took advantage of this law,
relying on their rhetorical powers to sway the jury rather than any
specialized legal knowledge. For example, one newly minted
attorney defending a man who killed his wife’s lover, argued
brazenly for jury nullification, insisting that the man’s actions were
justified by the “mountain common law.”269 Indeed, even Brigham
Young appeared as counsel in another 1851 case.270 Early Utah
lawyers did attempt to raise the standards among members of the bar
by founding a short-lived “law school” taught by the territory’s first
chief justice “who tender[ed] his sirvis [sic] as a teacher gratis for the

265. Id. at 168 (“By 1840 the profession’s real power had reached a level that was almost
immune to front attacks.”).
266. 2 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA
106 (1965).
267. Id.
268. An Act for the Regulation of Attorneys §1 in 1852 ACTS, supra note 174.
269. See Kenneth L. Cannon II, “Mountain Common Law”: The Extralegal Punishment of
Seducers in Early Utah, 51 UTAH HIST. Q. 309, 310–14 (1983).
270. Id. at 310. In this case, Young also represented a man accused of killing the seducer
of his wife. The case was tried before the Territorial Supreme Court and Young’s opponent
was the Mormon attorney Hosea Stout. The man was acquitted.
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benefit of all those who wish to inter [sic] into the Study of Law.”271
The “Law School,” however, does not seem to have survived beyond
the winter of 1851–1852.272
As conditions on the Mormon frontier became more settled, the
leaders of the bar sought to recreate the closed and learned
profession they imagined in the East by imposing additional
requirements on the practice of law. By 1876, the Supreme Court of
the Territory required “the favorable report of an examining
Committee appointed for that purpose” before admitting a person to
practice in “this Court . . . [and] in all Courts in this Territory.”273
Perhaps most importantly, in 1869, the Union Pacific and Central
Pacific Railroads met at Promontory Point, Utah. Retracing the steps
of their parents in reverse, young men from Mormon country began
riding the trains east to study in the law schools that, following the
example of Langdell’s Harvard, were emerging as the gatekeepers of
the legal profession.274 Those who returned west after studying at
Michigan and other eastern schools felt that they had been socialized
into an entirely different legal profession than the half-educated
courtroom brawlers Young had denounced in the 1850s. “[O]ur
people generally,” wrote one such Mormon lawyer, “were not
familiar with the ethics and high ideals that college law students have
instilled in them by their teachers and the leaders of the legal
profession.”275
The railroad also set in motion economic changes that would
transform the nature of litigation. Brigham Young enthusiastically
supported the coming of the railroad, which he saw as a means of
hastening Latter-day Saint immigrants from overseas to the Mormon

271. 2 ON THE MORMON FRONTIER, supra note 144, at 410. Stout reports the content
of instruction thus: “the Judge [Zararubbel Snow] gave us a short lecture on the nature and
origin of government & law, after which it was agreed to establish the school.” Id.
272. Id. at 411–12 (recording meetings of the “Law School” during the winter of 1851–
52).
273. Rules of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, Rule 21, 1 Utah 1, 7 (1876).
274. See, e.g., JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE
STATE 15–21 (1951) (discussing George Sutherland’s move from Provo, Utah to Ann Arbor,
Michigan to study law and his return to Utah to practice); MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note
257, at 107–08 (discussing Utahns who traveled east to study law prior to 1882); see also
JONATHAN LURIE, LAW AND THE NATION: 1865–1912, at 43–54 (1983) (discussing Langdell
and the rise of American law schools).
275. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 109.
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Zion in the Great Basin.276 However, it also marked the beginning of
the integration of Mormon country into the national economy, a
trend that the Mormons initially fought with a renewed emphasis on
home manufactures, cooperative economic endeavors, and a boycott
of Gentile merchants.277 In the end, however, these efforts could not
succeed against the massive forces of economic integration in the
wake of the Civil War.
Not surprisingly, these forces changed the nature of litigation
among Latter-day Saints, presenting problems that the church courts
were ultimately ill-equipped to handle. The economic depression
that swept the nation in 1893 provides an illustration. Beginning
with panics in the distant financial centers of London and New York,
the depression spread rapidly through the nation’s increasingly
integrated economy, throwing thousands out of work and drying up
credit for troubled enterprises.278 Mormon businessmen in Utah
found themselves scrambling to secure payment of debts in a falling
market that was pushing many into bankruptcy. The natural move in
such a situation would be for the creditor to obtain a lien on a
debtor’s property as rapidly as possible so as to secure repayment
regardless of how the debtor’s assets were distributed. The church
courts, however, could only apply personal pressure to litigants
before them. They lacked the ability to provide the kind of in rem
remedies needed in the context of a race for the courthouse. The
result was a Hobson’s choice for many Mormon businessmen, who
found themselves at a ruinous disadvantage vis-à-vis Gentiles who
could pursue actions without impediment in the civil courts.279 These
forces ultimately pushed Mormons to abandon the church courts.
One Mormon lawyer later explained:
For a good illustration, my bishop, an exceptionally splendid man,
was in the mercantile business in Salt Lake City. All ward bishops
presided over a bishop’s court. But he came to me and said, “I have
never sued a brother. And it greatly disturbs me to do so, but I

276. See ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM, supra note 84, at 236.
277. Id. at 240.
278. See generally CHARLES HOFFMAN, THE DEPRESSION OF THE NINETIES: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY (1970) (discussing the panic of 1893 and the resulting global economic
depression). For a discussion of the effect of the Panic on business in Mormon country and the
state of church finances, see RONALD W. WALKER, QUALITIES THAT COUNT: HEBER J. GRANT
AS BUSINESSMAN, MISSIONARY, AND APOSTLE 115–42 (2004).
279. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 10–11.
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must or go into bankruptcy and let the property of my debtors be
taken by strangers who have recently come among us.” The
conclusion was inevitable, and suits at law rapidly became
common.280

Other forces were at work as well. After the Civil War, the first
truly national capital markets emerged, and with them the
corporation became the dominant form of business organization. In
1870, the territorial legislature adopted a general incorporation
statute that allowed any group of people who were “desirous of
associating themselves together for establishing and conducting any
mining, manufacturing, commercial or other industrial pursuit in this
Territory” to create a corporation.281 While church courts initially
did not hesitate to take jurisdiction over disputes involving Mormondominated corporations (particularly corporations that were part of
communal Mormon economic efforts), church leaders eventually
decided to disclaim jurisdiction over corporations.282 The separation
of ownership and control inherent in the corporate form necessarily
created legal duties on the part of directors and officers. Did a
Mormon corporate officer with a fiduciary duty to bring suit on
behalf of a corporation violate his religious duties if the corporation
sued another Mormon?283
Ironically, the First Presidency found itself in the position of
seeking legal advice from its general counsel on the fiduciary duties
of members in order to resolve cases appealed to it, injecting lawyers
into the very apex of a system designed to exclude them from

280. Id. at 11.
281. An Act Providing for Incorporating Associations, for Mining, Manufacturing,
Commercial and Other Industrial Pursuits § 1, in ACTS, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS,
PASSED AND ADOPTED DURING THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH (1870).
282. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 110.
283. James Henry Moyle, a Mormon attorney active in Utah from the 1880s on, records
one such case:
It was in the early 1890s that I was put on trial in the Twelfth Ward before the
bishop with all of the leading officers of a corporation for suing a brother in court.
It was my only offense in a Church court but in this case I was only the attorney.
The case was promptly dismissed when the corporate offense of the defendants
became apparent, which it very soon did.
MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 137.
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adjudication.284 Church leaders ultimately decided that rather than
wading into these difficulties, church courts should simply avoid
resolving such disputes. “In applying [the rule that Mormons should
resolve their disputes in church courts],” wrote The Deseret Evening
News, “corporations whose stock holders may be Church members
are not included, and have no standing in Church courts, which are
for the benefit and discipline of members individually.”285
Another force at work was the growth of the legal profession. In
the late nineteenth century the number of lawyers in America
skyrocketed. For example, in 1880 there were roughly 64,000
lawyers in the country, but thirty years later the number had nearly
doubled to 122,000.286 The expansion of the legal profession in the
West, however, was even more rapid. Nationally, there was roughly
one lawyer per thousand in 1850. By 1890 that number had risen to
nearly 1.5 lawyers per thousand.287 In the West, however, there were
less than 0.5 lawyers per thousand in 1850, while by 1890 the region
was well ahead of the national average with over 2.5 lawyers per
thousand.288 The explosion of the profession in the West was largely
the result of legal uncertainty created by Congress. In the years after
the Civil War, Congress passed a series of laws designed to
encourage farming, ranching, mining, and railroading in the Far

284. For example, in an 1896 case, the First Presidency was faced with a church suit
against a woman who had sued another Mormon on behalf of an estate for which she was the
administratrix. The secretary to the First Presidency wrote to the stake president in the case:
Brother Richards [Franklin S. Richards, general counsel to the church] is of the
opinion that the court will not permit her to waive any of her legal rights in this
matter, and that she should be free to wind up the estate as the law directs. The first
presidency see this matter in the light in which Brother Richards presents it, and
they request that you write the parties (Sister Bouton and the Brothers Harris) to
this effect, which will leave Sister Bouton free to act in this matter as she may be
legally advised; and this will leave her in the position as though no arbitration
proceedings had been taken.
Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 3:16 (reproducing a letter from George F. Gibbs to
President E.D. Wooley).
285. Lawsuits Between Church Members, DESERT EVENING NEWS, Feb. 1, 1896, at 1.
286. LURIE, supra note 274, at 43.
287. See Kelly Paulson, Lawyers and the American West: An Empirical Investigation into
the Components of Demand for Legal Services from 1850 to 1930, at 8 graph 1 (2005)
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, Stanford University), available at http://wwwecon.stanford.edu/academics/Honors_Theses/Theses_2005/Paulson.pdf.
The
regional
definitions are those used by the Census Bureau. Id. at 9 (“The Western region mirrors the
Census classification.”).
288. Id. at 9 graph 2.
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West. They did this by granting huge amounts of federally owned
land to those willing to develop it. The result was a legal bonanza, as
those involved in the land grabs litigated over title to property and
the meaning of complex and newly minted federal statutes.289 These
economic forces, however, changed the nature of civil litigation. No
longer was it a generally accessible ritual in which lawyers tried to
sway juries with their rhetorical skills, while the local crowd looked
on. Rather, litigation in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s became a
specialized affair involving increasingly well-trained attorneys arguing
over the implications of arcane federal statutes. The public spectacle
of litigation that had so concerned Brigham Young in the 1850s and
1860s was largely dead a generation later.
Litigation over the ownership of land illustrates the complexity
of the legal environment as the nineteenth century progressed. When
the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in the summer of 1847, the
region was still nominally Mexican territory, part of the province of
Upper California. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the
entire region transferred to the United States.290 Neither Mexican
nor American authorities, however, granted formal title to the
Mormons, who were, legally speaking, squatters. Rather, the church
allocated land first on a communal basis and then to individual
settlers.291 The uncertain legal status of these ecclesiastical land grants
led to contradictory Mormon attitudes toward federal land law. On
one hand, they repeatedly petitioned Congress for a territorial land
office to regularize title to their land. At the same time, they feared
289. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that litigation and the demand
for lawyers is driven by legal uncertainty). Kelly Paulson provides empirical support for this
conclusion by running regression analysis of the number of lawyers against indicia of railroad
and mining activity. He concludes, “given the lingering significance of the Western dummy in
1860, 1870, 1890, and 1900, it seems that the railroad and mining variables, while explaining
most of the Western effect, do not account for all of it.” Paulson, supra note 287, at 25.
Paulson’s conclusion is also supported by a qualitative analysis of the (very limited) surviving
Utah Territorial Court records for civil cases, the vast bulk of which are from after the Civil
War and involve litigation over property rights conferred under federal statutes.
290. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, U.S.–Mexico, art. V, Feb.
2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (setting forth the new border between the United States and Mexico,
ceding all of the Great Basin to the United States).
291. See Lawrence L. Linford, Establishing and Maintaining Land Ownership in Utah
Prior to 1869; 42 UTAH HIST. Q. 126, 127–28 (1974) (tracing the history of land ownership
in early Utah); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1342–44
(1993) (providing an economic theory of why Mormons shifted from communal to private
ownership of land in early Utah).
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that new settlers would take advantage of federal legislation to
appropriate communally or privately held Mormon lands. Nor were
their fears entirely unfounded, as federal officials regarded land policy
as a tool for diluting Mormon power in Utah Territory. “There can
be no doubt,” wrote the federal Surveyor General of Colorado and
Utah in 1864, “that the true policy of the government in regard to
Utah is to encourage the emigration to that Territory of a
population less hostile to the United States than the present.”292 He
went on to write, “[t]o do this, Gentile emigration must have the
chance of acquiring title to the land, and must be protected in that
title.”293
The result in Utah was sporadic hostility toward federal surveyors
in the 1850s, violence toward Gentile claim jumpers in the 1860s,
and gradual regularization of title to land beginning in 1870.294
Throughout Mormon country, however, the title of Mormon settlers
to land remained uncertain. Virtually all of the settlements began as
church-sponsored “missions” directed by the Mormon hierarchy in
Salt Lake City, and most Mormon settlers acquired land initially via
an ecclesiastical grant. The situation was further complicated in the
decades after the Civil War as Congress passed a slew of statutes
multiplying the methods by which ownership of public land could be
moved into private hands.
The case of Birdsall v. Leavitt illustrates these problems.295 The
Birdsall family moved from Nebraska to Utah in 1881, eventually
settling in Sevier County, located in the central part of the
Territory.296 Three years later, the family converted to Mormonism.
Members of the Birdsall family began trying to acquire land under
various federal statutes. They purchased land from the Rio Grande
railroad, which had been given huge tracts by Congress as a
subsidy.297 They also claimed land under the Timber Culture Act,
which granted “ten acres of timber on any quarter section” of public

292. Linford, supra note 291, at 137.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 134–43.
295. See generally Ardis E. Parshall, “Church Hounds Woman to Madness”: The Trials of
Cora Birdsall, unpublished paper presented at the August, 2002, Sunstone Symposium, Salt
Lake City, Utah.
296. See Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 2:321 (testimony of Isaac Birdsall).
297. See Deed, Sevier County, Utah, Book 28 Entry 5289 (11 June 1904) (Birdsall deed
to the disputed land).
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land to any person “who shall plant, protect, and keep in a healthy,
growing condition for eight years.”298 The land the Birdsalls claimed,
however, had long before been claimed by an earlier settler, who had
sold the property to a James Leavitt in 1883.299 Leavitt, who had
“owned” the land for a decade in 1893 when the Birdsalls first
claimed it, insisted later that they agreed to sell to him the portion
he occupied, thus quieting title.300 The Panic of 1893, however, kept
Leavitt from obtaining financing, although he apparently gave the
Birdsalls some cows in partial payment.301 In doing so, Leavitt seems
to have been trying to follow the established Mormon policy for
dealing with title conflicts between older settlers and claims based on
federal statutes. As the First Presidency explained in a 1903 letter to
one bishop:
With President Young we hold that when any person secures title
from the Government to land, part of which has been occupied and
cultivated by others, he or she should respect the rights of such
persons by being willing to deed to them the land they have
improved, provided that they pay their share of the expenses
incurred in securing the Government title, and also a fair
remuneration to the pre-emptor or homesteader for the loss of his
or her preemption or homestead right in proportion to the amount
of land to which they are benefited.302

Without successfully finalizing his claim to the land, Isaac
Birdsall conveyed it to his daughter Cora, who eventually gained title
under the Timber Culture Act.303 Leavitt continued to press his

298. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act to Encourage the Growth of Timber on
the Western Prairies” §1, 20 Stat. 113 (1878). See also Minutes of a Special Session of the
High Council of Sevier Stake of Zion Held at the Tabernacle, Richfield, Utah, Tabernacle
(Oct. 21, 1902), reprinted in Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 2:331 (“Isaac Birdsall first
took the land under the timbericulture act.”).
299. See Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 2:326 (reproducing a statement by William A.
Warnock). Sevier County was not settled by Mormons formally called to pioneer in the area.
Rather, as the Mormon population filled up more hospitable valleys to the east, Mormons
moved into the area on their own. Their efforts, however, ultimately received substantial
encouragement and economic support from the church. See generally Leonard J. Arrington,
Taming the Turbulent Sevier: A Story of Mormon Desert Conquest, 5 W. HUMAN. REV. 393
(1951) (discussing the settlement of Sevier County).
300. See 2 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 331–32.
301. Id.
302. 3 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 18 (reproducing a letter from the First
Presidency to Bishop O.B. Andersen).
303. 2 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 333.
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claims based on the rights of the earlier settler as well as the 1893
agreement with Birdsall. In 1901, he “prefer[red] a charge of
unchristianlike conduct against Isaac Birdsall and Sister Cora
Birdsall” before their bishop.304 All parties appeared and presented
evidence. The bishop issued a decision “[t]hat Cora Birdsall shall
deed unto James E. Leavitt [the disputed land].”305 Cora wrote the
First Presidency asking for permission to proceed at law, and received
a letter instructing her to appeal to the Sevier Stake High Council if
she was dissatisfied with the bishop’s decision.306 She did so, the case
was retried, and the High Council affirmed the decision of the
bishop’s court.307 The High Council seemed to regard the Birdsalls’
actions as an underhanded attempt to use the federal statutes to rob
Leavitt of his property. “If you were placed in Leavitt’s place and
paid for the land and possessed it,” one of the High Councilors
asked Cora during the trial, “would you feel right if you were treated
as he is?”308 Cora appealed to the First Presidency, and in 1903
received a letter affirming the High Council’s decision.309 She
refused to deed the land to Leavitt and was subsequently
excommunicated.310
At this point, the litigation took an unexpected turn. After her
excommunication, Cora began acting increasingly distraught and
erratic. In February, 1904 a doctor from the state mental hospital
adjudged her insane, insisting that she suffered from hereditary
madness. In June, 1904, Cora was visited by local priesthood leaders
who gave her a blessing and insisted that she could be rebaptized if
she would comply with the decision of the church courts and deed
the disputed land to Leavitt. She did so and was rebaptized, but her
mental condition continued to deteriorate.311 By this time, Utah had
chosen Mormon apostle Reed Smoot to become its new U.S.
Senator, sparking a national drive to unseat him, a movement Cora’s

304. Id. at 326 (reproducing a letter from James E. Leavitt to Cora Birdsall).
305. Id. at 327 (reproducing a letter from Bishop Samuel W. Goold and his counselors to
Cora Birdsall).
306. Id. at 328 (reproducing a letter from the First Presidency to Cora Birdsall).
307. 2 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 336 (reproducing a letter from the Sevier Stake
Presidency to Cora Birdsall).
308. Id. at 335.
309. Id. at 337 (reproducing a letter from the First Presidency to Cora Birdsall).
310. Id. at 339 (reproducing a letter from J. M. Lauritzen to Cora Birdsall).
311. Id. at 339–41.
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father was willing to support. The Senate Committee on Privileges
and Elections launched a massive investigation of the economic,
legal, and political affairs of the Mormon church,312 and in
December, 1904, Isaac Birdsall traveled east to testify before the
Senators. For a brief moment, the case became national news,
providing evidence of Mormon dominance in Utah.313
The case did not stop with the newspapers. Upon his return to
Utah, Isaac Birdsall, acting as guardian for his daughter, sued Leavitt
for the disputed land, arguing that the deed Cora had executed was
invalid. The district court rejected his claim that she was mentally
incompetent and that the elders who “labored” with her to comply
with the church court’s decision exercised undue influence, writing:
All churches . . . have a right to discipline their members and . . .
they have a right to handle such person so far as their fellowship in
such . . . church is concerned. The members, however, are under
no legal obligations to obey such regulation or decision of their . . .
church . . . .314

On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, however, Birdsall
prevailed.315 The Court held that “[Cora], at the time she executed
the deed, was mentally incapacitated and therefore incompetent to

312. See generally KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY: THE SEATING OF SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE (2004) (recounting
Smoot’s election and the congressional investigation that it precipitated).
313. See generally Apostle Again Takes the Stand: Story of a Bishop’s Court: How One Case
Was Decided in Utah, SALT LAKE HERALD, Dec. 20, 1904, at 1; Apostle J.H. Smith Again on
Stand, DESERET EVENING NEWS, Dec. 19, 1904, at 1 (discussing the case); Apostle Smith on
the Stand: Strange Case of Isaac Birdsall, His Daughter, His Land, and Why He Left Church,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 20, 1904, at 7; John Henry Smith Denies Idaho Story: Isaac Birdsall
Testifies to Alleged Forcing of Property from Members of the Church, MORNING EXAMINER
(Ogden, UT), Dec. 20, 1904, at 1; Mormonism Taught in School Buildings: Girl Deprived of
Property: Excommunicated Until She Gave It to the Church, Her Father Testifies at Smoot
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1904, at 6; Mormons in Schools: Testimony Shows that Religions
Classes Exist, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1904, at 4; Plural Marriages Not Authorized: Apostle John
Henry Smith Says He Found No Evidence that Any Had Been Performed in Mexico, as Said,
SALT LAKE TELEGRAM, Dec. 19, 1904, at 2; Public Against Apostle Smoot: Opposed by
Sentiment of Country, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 25, 1904, at 5; Smith Concludes His Testimony:
Birdsall Land Case, IDAHO DAILY STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1904, at 2; The Birdsall Land Case,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 22, 1904, at 4; Woman Banned by the Church: Excommunicated
Because She Wouldn’t Obey Mormon Chief: Bishop’s Court Deprived Her of Property to Which She
Held Lawful Title, and When She Defied Court She Was Put Under Arrest, ATLANTA CONST.
(Georgia), Dec. 20, 1904, at 3.
314. Court Findings in Birdsall Case, DESERET EVENING NEWS, Sept. 30, 1905, at 7.
315. Birdsall v. Leavitt, 89 P. 397, 399 (Utah 1907).
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make the same.”316 The justices went on to signal their concerns with
the church courts: “While courts do not interfere in disputes
between churches and their members in respect to church or spiritual
affairs, the property rights of the members will be protected as
readily from church interference as from any other.”317
The perennially pugnacious Salt Lake Tribune, always anxious to
attack the Mormon majority, hailed the court’s decision with glee.
“The opinion of the Supreme Court,” wrote the paper, “is a stinging
castigation of the methods brought to bear by the Mormon elders. It
is a ringing denunciation of the methods of the ‘church
courts . . . .’”318 Elsewhere, the Tribune insisted that “[t]he decision
made by the Supreme Court . . . will excite the admiration and win
the support of all mankind.” As for the church courts,
[t]he attention of the civilized world is called anew to the horrors
of the hierarchical rule in Utah. . . . [This case] illustrates perfectly
the treasonable autocracy with which the hierarchs dominate over
the civil government; it demonstrates their intention to maintain
themselves as superior to earthly law . . . .319

All of these developments took place against a background of
decades of legal hostility to Mormon institutions and practices. The
most dramatic manifestation of this hostility, of course, was the
massive federal legal crusade against polygamy, but the Mormon
antipathy toward the common law did not go unnoticed. Rather
than seeing Mormon practice as the afterlife of a Protestant tradition
of civil dispute resolution in church courts, Mormonism’s mainly
Protestant critics in the last half of the nineteenth century saw it as
further evidence of Mormonism’s sinister and un-American power in
Utah. For example, Robert N. Baskin, the chief legal strategist
against the Mormon Church in Utah in the nineteenth century,
strikingly begins his memoirs of conflict with the Mormons by
noting their hostility to the common law:
All the states except Louisiana, and territories except Utah, had by
statute adopted the common law so far as applicable to the new

316. Id. at 397.
317. Id. at 399.
318. Birdsall Triumphs in Supreme Court: Great Outrage Perpetrated by Church Tribunals
Thoroughly Put Right, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 9, 1907, at 3.
319. The Supreme Court Decides Against the Tyrant, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 10, 1907, at
6.
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conditions. That law was and is indispensably necessary for the
proper government of any American community. It was, therefore,
the imperative duty of the Utah legislature to adopt it at the first
territorial session. Instead of doing so the foregoing absurd section
of the judiciary act excluding it was passed.320

Note the way in which Baskin identified the common law with
the “American community,” marking Mormon antipathy toward
that law as evidence of their status as un-American outsiders. As
Gentiles penetrated Utah, the church courts became one of the flash
points in the increasingly bitter battles between Mormons and nonMormons for political, economic, and social power in Utah.321 For
example, the first “Gentile” newspaper in Utah—The Valley Tan,
named for a locally brewed whiskey of the same name—claimed that
Brigham Young’s denunciations of lawyers were part of a plot to
“throw obloquy upon the character of law courts and drive the
people into their ecclesiastical courts, for the adjustment of all
grievances.”322 The ultimate goal was “suppressing the Judiciary, and
depriving men of their Constitutional rights of trial, by due process of
law . . . .”323 Likewise, in the eyes of the anti-Mormon Salt Lake
Tribune, Mormons who refused to comply with the edicts of church
courts were praised for preserving their “manhood,” while those
who accepted ecclesiastical decisions, the Tribune insisted, “are not
men who are fit to exercise the more sacred rights of American
citizenship.”324
The rhetoric surrounding the Birdsall case powerfully illustrates
the way in which allegiance to the secular courts became a condition

320. R. N. BASKIN, REMINISCENCES OF EARLY UTAH 6 (Signature Books 2007) (1914).
321. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002) (recounting
the political and legal confrontation between Mormons and the federal government over
polygamy and other Mormon practices); ROBERT JOSEPH DWYER, THE GENTILE COMES TO
UTAH: A STUDY IN RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1862–1890) (1948) (discussing nonMormon settlement in Utah and the resulting tension between Mormons and “Gentiles”).
322. Kirk Anderson, Esq., VALLEY TAN, Dec. 24, 1858, at 3.
323. Id.
324. Church Robbery, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 1, 1891, at 4. Similarly, when a Mormon
witness stated before Congress that “the judiciary are the judges” of whether people are
protected in their inherent rights, the Tribune insisted that his words had an esoteric and
treasonable meaning. “He meant the chiefs of the Church when sitting as a Church court, and
nothing else, and he would obey an edict of that court if it was in direct violation of the laws of
the land, after being upheld, unanimously, by the court of last resort in this Republic.” A Little
More of Richards, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 9, 1888, at 2.
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for full entry into the American community. The Washington Post
reported that the bishop’s court had deprived Cora of “property to
which she held the lawful title,”325 while the Washington Times noted
that “[p]robably there is not another organization in the United
States with the gall to set itself up as a judicial authority and apply its
own code, regardless of statutory law.”326 The Times went on to
compare the Mormons to the “Chinese highbinders of San
Francisco,” writing:
[The Chinese] are reckoned to be living in heathen darkness. They
scorn utterly the duly constituted courts, even in relation to such
serious acts as murder. However, there is not involved in their
demeanor any threat to society. They are aliens, in no manner
concerned with the affairs of the land. They . . . could no more
appreciate what we think is civilization than they could fly. They do
not think in terms that can be grasped by any but the Oriental
mind.327

The racial status of the Mormons, however, made their courts much
more threatening. “The Mormon is in our midst . . . .” the paper
wrote. “His defiance is brazen, deliberate, and the climax of
arrogance.”328 The editorial closed darkly, “If any banded bigots can
rise superior to the United States, it is interesting to watch them rise,
and speculate as to the character of the meat on which they feed.”329
In short, the hostility of Mormons to the common law was evidence
that they—like the Chinese—were dangerous outsiders.
In an era when the Mormon Church was aggressively seeking the
shelter of respectability after decades of intense hostility, it is not
surprising that church leaders had actually been trying to disentangle
the church courts from disputes over land for some time by 1900. In
1896, the Deseret News published an article instructing that “in cases
involving title to lands . . . the Church courts could not consider
them if requested to do so, as the Church discipline is such that it
will not attempt the adjustment of any controversy where there

325. Mormons in Schools: Testimony Shows that Religions Classes Exist, supra note 313, at
4.
326. Public Against Apostle Smoot: Opposed by Sentiment of Country, supra note 313, at 5
(citing the Washington Times).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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might be a possibility of conflict with the laws of the land.”330
Likewise, during the 1890s, the First Presidency sent a number of
letters instructing lower church courts not to try cases “when matters
relating to the boundary of lands and kindred subjects are in
dispute.”331 The First Presidency’s pronouncements, however, were
ambivalent. Another, 1896 letter reads:
We can not, as a church, put ourselves in the position of using our
church courts to enforce the laws or to set aside the laws or the
decisions of the courts. With a little reflection you can readily see
that this would be dangerous. But if men who are members of the
church act unjustly and trespass upon their neighbor’s rights by the
misuse of the law or by taking advantage we can deal with them.332

Church leaders wished both to avoid the perception of hostility
to the common law, but also desired to discipline members for
conduct that, while technically legal, violated religious standards.
Elsewhere, the First Presidency seemed to draw the jurisdictional line
for church courts between in personam complaints against individuals
and in rem attempts to settle title to land.333 Not surprisingly, the
precise limits of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in cases like Birdsall v.
Leavitt, which involved claims based on both the title of earlier

330. Lawsuits Between Church Members, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 1, 1896, at 8.
331. 3 Smoot Hearings, supra note 87, at 14 (reproducing a letter from the First
Presidency to the President and High Council of the Bannock Stake). For a reproduction of a
number of letters from the First Presidency regarding land disputes in church courts, see id. et
seq.
332. Id. at 15 (reproducing a letter from the First Presidency to Elder John A. Kidman).
333. The First Presidency explained the policy thus in a 1903 letter:
Before our lands were surveyed by the Government settlements had been formed
and boundaries clearly established. After the survey was made it was found that, as a
general thing, the lines of a quarter section would run through the lands of more
than one settler; and in order that every man might have title to that which
belonged to him, one of the interested parties would comply with the provisions of
the law and obtain title, and after doing this he would deed to others such portions
of the homestead entry as belonged to them; and it was not an uncommon thing for
our church courts to settle disputes arising under those circumstances. But since the
Government survey it has not been customary for church courts to entertain
complaints involving the title to lands, and the same may be said with respect to
water. All disputes involving legal titles must be adjudicated by courts of competent
jurisdiction. The point we wish to make clear is this, that church courts must not
undertake to deprive any of its members of their legal rights.
Id. at 18. The letter, however, went on to insist that members had an obligation to
accommodate the claims of earlier settlers whose rights conflicted with government surveys. Id.
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settlers and personal contracts, was unclear.334 The resulting
confusion, however, exposed the church to widespread charges of
duplicity, as church leaders had claimed during the Smoot hearings
that church courts did not adjudicate cases involving land.
In the years after the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Birdsall
v. Leavitt, high church leaders resolved to further limit the
jurisdiction of church courts. In October, 1908, a committee of
apostles authored a report to the First Presidency suggesting that
church courts “be not used as agencies for the collection of ordinary
debts.”335 The report went on to suggest that “Church Courts shall
not be used to enforce compliance with [the] moral obligation” to
pay debts discharged in bankruptcy or otherwise unenforceable at
law.336 The report, however, reveals the same ambivalent attitude
seen in the First Presidency letters on land disputes a decade earlier.
The church was unwilling to say that questions of church discipline
were disposed of by resolving questions of legality. Hence, the report
stated:
[B]ut if a member of the church shall unjustly, and in an
unchristianlike manner, bring his brother before the civil courts, or
if there be an element of fraud or dishonesty on the part of a
member who owes a debt, which he refused to pay, either would
be liable to trial for his fellowship in the church by the Bishops
Court or High Council.337

Likewise, while church courts were not to be used to enforce debts
discharged by bankruptcy, “every consistent effort should be made

334. The Birdsall case was probably further complicated by the fact that in 1896, just five
years before Leavitt preferred charges to Cora’s bishop, the First Presidency had sent a letter to
the Sevier Stake President specifically encouraging him to promote the arbitration of title
disputes among his flock. Id. at 17 (reproducing a letter from the First Presidency to President
W.H. Seegmiller stating that they “heartily approve” arbitration of a dispute over title to “22
acres of school land”). In context, the First Presidency seems to have endorsed arbitration as a
process separate from church courts whereby “[t]here is a method which can be adopted under
the law by which the decision of arbitrators can be entered on the court records and made
legal.” Id. It is possible, however, that when the Birdsall case came before his High Council,
President Seegmiller did not make a distinction between arbitration and church courts, taking
the previous letter as permission for church courts to hear land disputes. In any case, none of
the First Presidency correspondence in the Birdsall case suggests that they regarded the dispute
as being improper for church courts.
335. FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 17, at 343 (quoting the report).
336. Id. at 343–44 (quoting the report).
337. Id. at 343.
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to persuade [debtors financially able to pay discharged debts] to
settle with their former creditors.”338
The reality, however, was that the Mormon judiciary was already
in decline by 1908. Indeed, in urban areas Mormons seemed to have
largely abandoned the church courts for civil disputes by the turn of
the century. In 1904, Mormon attorney James Henry Moyle was
called to the High Council of the newly organized Ensign Stake in
Salt Lake City, where he continued to serve for more than twenty
years. During that time, the High Council did not consider a single
civil dispute. “So ended,” he wrote, “a salient feature of pioneer
times when pretty much all were of one faith.”339 Ecclesiastical
disputes in outlying settlements where the legal culture was simpler
continued for longer, as illustrated by the Birdsall case. As late as
1919, an article in the church-published Improvement Era stated
that:
We hold that in matters of difference between brethren, in which
no specific infraction of the secular law is involved, and in offenses
called “civil” as distinguished from “criminal”, it is truly unworthy
of members of the Church today as it was in Paul’s time that
“brother goeth to law with brother” and that it stands to our
shame if righteous judgment cannot be rendered among
ourselves.340

Despite this plea, however, Mormons continued to take their
civil disputes to the secular courts. The forces of a modernizing
economy, the quest of Mormon lawyers for religious legitimacy
within their community, and not least the importance of allegiance
to the common law as a condition for Mormon entry into the
American community had combined to end the judging of civil cases
within the temple of the church.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inheritors of a strong Protestant tradition of church
discipline, early Mormons took it for granted that adjudication was a
central religious practice, and as Joseph Smith developed his

338. Id. at 344.
339. MORMON DEMOCRAT, supra note 257, at 136.
340. James E. Talmage, Judiciary System of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
IMPROVEMENT ERA, April, 1919 at 498, 499 reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL JAMES E. TALMAGE
198, 200 (James P. Harris ed., 1997).
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increasingly radical theology in the 1830s and 1840s he found ways
of embedding the emerging Mormon judiciary within its narratives.
This Article began with two contrasting stories: one about Mormon
elders preaching to a court-day crowd, and the other about Mormon
elders adjudicating a civil dispute in their Temple. The arc
connecting these events illustrates the relationship between religion
and litigation for nineteenth-century Latter-day Saints. The
Mormons wished to preach to the court house, denouncing its
divisiveness, chicanery, and corrosive moral spectacle. At the same
time, they wished to domesticate civil disputes, forcing litigious
church members to embed their arguments within the theological
narratives and institutional settings of the church. Suing before the
ungodly was to be replaced by lawsuits in the Temple.
In a world where most disputes were relatively simple and could
be resolved without specialized legal knowledge, such a system was
tenable. Indeed, given the frequent legal illiteracy of frontier judges,
church courts were not necessarily even at a comparative
disadvantage vis-à-vis secular courts with regard to legal knowledge.
With the economic integration that came in the wake of the Civil
War and more importantly the completion of the transcontinental
railroad in 1869, the disputes church courts were called upon to
resolve became increasingly complicated. In addition, the nature of
civil litigation itself changed in ways that made it less religiously
objectionable. Given these forces, the decline of the Mormon court
system is less surprising than the fact that it continued to aggressively
operate for decades after the coming of the railroad.
An important part of this transition was the creation of a
religiously sanctioned persona for Latter-day Saint lawyers. This not
only facilitated the softening of Mormon attitudes toward recourse
to secular courts but also provided a bridge that allowed Mormons
to maintain continuity to the older tradition of the church judiciary.
In 1856, Brigham Young referred to litigation as a Satanic froth that
right-thinking Latter-day Saints should avoid.341 In 1872, however,
he insisted that “[f]or a man to understand the law is very
excellent.”342 He went on to explain the proper Mormon
understanding of the law: “They that [understand the law],” he

341. Young, supra note 187, at 237.
342. Young, supra note 253, at 224.
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insisted, “are peacemakers, they are legitimate lawyers.”343 This
vision of law properly understood could continue even in the
absence of church courts deciding civil cases. It also facilitated
Mormon acceptance of the common law by providing continuity
with the older tradition of church courts, even as these tribunals
were abandoned as part of Mormonism’s accommodation with
American Protestantism.
Indeed, this vision of law properly understood continues to be
echoed in modern Mormon sermons. For example, in 1986, former
law professor and judge Dallin H. Oaks, then a Mormon Apostle,
gave a sermon to the church’s semiannual general conference
denouncing sharp dealing and frivolous litigation:
We live in a world where many look on the marketplace as a
ruthless arena where the buyer must beware, where no one is
obligated to do more than the law requires, and where fraud isn’t
fraud unless you can prove it in court.
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ have a higher standard.344

He went on to denounce “[s]cheming promoters with glib
tongues and ingratiating manners [who] deceive their neighbors into
investments . . . . Difficulties of proof make fraud a hard crime to
enforce. But the inadequacies of the laws of man provide no license
for transgressions under the laws of God.”345 Likewise, he
condemned “[p]ersons who prosecute frivolous lawsuits.”346 In the
same sermon, however, he praised an “idealistic young professional,”
presumably an attorney, who denounced the illegal and unchristian
treatment of migrant farm workers.347 The themes of supra-legal
religious obligations, the denunciation of litigation, and the role of
the religiously informed professional mark the afterlife of the ideals
that both gave rise to the expansive jurisdiction of the Mormon
courts in the nineteenth century and negotiated its eventual decline.
Likewise, something of the First Presidency’s ambivalence in the
1890s remains in the current procedures governing Mormon courts,
which continue to operate albeit on a smaller scale. Today, the

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Id.
Dallin H. Oaks, Brother’s Keeper, ENSIGN, Nov. 1986, at 20.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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justification for the Mormon judiciary is couched almost entirely in
pastoral terms. According to modern guidelines promulgated by the
church, ecclesiastical discipline exists to “facilitate repentance by
helping transgressors recognize and forsake sin, seek forgiveness,
make restitution, and demonstrate a renewed commitment to keep
the commandments.”348 Consonant with Oaks’ sermon, however,
the church refuses to concede its prerogative to inquire into
misconduct related to civil litigation: “Disciplinary councils should
not attempt to resolve disputes over property rights or other civil
controversies. However, if such a dispute involves accusations that a
member has committed acts that would justify Church discipline, the
accusations should be treated like any other accusations of
transgressions.”349
In a similar vein, the modern rules state that “[n]ormally a
disciplinary council is not held to consider conduct being examined
by a criminal trial until the court has reached a final judgment” but
clearly reserve the right to inquire into matters resolved in secular
courts.350 Indeed, the rules even contemplate that church leaders
might be asked by members to arbitrate disputes, but insist that in
such a case “they should act as unofficial, private advisers and should
not involve the Church.”351 In short, while the Mormon courts have
abandoned the expansive jurisdiction that they once claimed,
preaching continues to the court house, and judging continues apace
within the Temple.

348. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, CHURCH HANDBOOK OF
INSTRUCTIONS: BOOK 1, STAKE PRESIDENCIES AND BISHOPRICS 105 (2006) [hereinafter
CHURCH HANDBOOK]. I am indebted to President Brad Hansen of the Newport News
Virginia Stake of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints for access to this material. I
remain solely responsible for all interpretations offered here of church procedures. For an
extensive discussion of the modern role of church discipline among Mormons and its legal
implications, see Kif Augustine-Adams, The Web of Membership: The Consonance and Conflict of
Being American and Latter-day Saint, 13 J. L. & RELIGION 567 (1999).
349. CHURCH HANDBOOK, supra note 348, at 111.
350. Id. at 116.
351. Id. at 111.
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